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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
vs. : 
BROOKS BRADSHAW, : Case No. 20040975-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court granted in part the State's Petition for Certiorari Review of State v. 
Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298,99 P.3d 359. See Addendum A (Opinion). Jurisdiction exists 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & (5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 (West 2004) recognizes that each communication made 
in furtherance of a scheme to defraud constitutes a separate offense of communications fraud. 
The statute directs that the degree of each offense is determined by the aggregate monies 
obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme. Accord Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, ffl[ 
16&53n.l0. The issue on certiorari review is: 
Whether a scheme to defraud may include multiple victims defrauded of different 
things, at different times, in different places, and by different means? 
On certiorari review, this Court reviews the "decision of the court of appeals, not the 
decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). "The 
proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law." Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 
UT36,1f 17,977P.2dl201. 
STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Section 76-10-1801 is attached in Addendum B, together with any other provision 
cited in argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In November 2000, defendant was charged with one count of felony racketeering 
(RICO) and eleven counts of felony communications fraud (R. 1-11). Defendant waived 
preliminary hearing and was bound over for trial (R. 74). 
Pretrial, defendant moved to reduce the degree or number of the fraud charges (R. 85-
94). In his memorandum in support of his motion, defendant claimed that the 
communications fraud statute only permitted the degree of individual frauds to be aggregated 
when one victim was defrauded multiple times (R. 87-88). During the hearing on the 
motion, defendant modified his argument and agreed that his multiple misdemeanor charges 
could be combined and aggregated into a single felony count, but asserted that he could not 
be charged with multiple felonies (R155: 5-6). 
To resolve the pretrial motion, the parties stipulated to the evidence the prosecution 
would have introduced if defendant had not waived preliminary hearing (R. 76-84). See 
Addendum C (Stipulated Testimony). In sum, the stipulated facts established that between 
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March and June 2000, defendant approached fourteen people (eight individuals and three 
couples) who needed real estate financing (R. 1-11; 76-82). In each case, defendant falsely 
represented that he was a mortgager (id.). In each case, defendant falsely promised to secure 
financing and necessary documentation for a small up-front fee (id.). In each case, the 
victim[s] paid defendant the requested fee (id.). In each case, defendant did not perform the 
services he promised (id.). Defendant later admitted he defrauded the victims and used the 
illegally-obtained monies to pay his personal bills (R. 83-84). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to reduce the degree or number of the 
communications fraud counts (R. 117;R156:3-9). See Addendum D (Oral Ruling). The trial 
court concluded that the Utah's Communications Fraud statute allows the degree of an 
individual fraud to be determined by the aggregate monies obtained or sought to be obtained 
in the overall scheme to defraud (Rl 56:3-4). The trial court concluded that defendant could 
be charged with eleven (based on the number of communications) second-degree felonies 
(based on the aggregate monies obtained from the scheme).1 
Pursuant to plea negotiation, defendant entered guilty pleas to four reduced charges 
of attempted communications fraud, third degree felonies, conditioned upon his right to 
appeal the denial of his pretrial motion (R. 119-20,128; Rl 57: 2-9). See State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d935,938 (Utah App. 1988) & UtahR. Crim. P. 1 l(i) (both permitting conditional guilty 
pleas). The remaining charges were dismissed (R. 127-28). In January 2002, defendant was 
!In the same pretrial motion, defendant moved to quash the RICO charge, which 
motion was also denied (R156: 5-9). The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling 
and dismissed the RICO count. SeeBradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, \ 33. Certiorari 
review of this portion of the Bradshaw decision was denied. 
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sentenced to four concurrent terms of zero-to-five-years imprisonment and ordered to make 
full restitution to the victims (R 140-42; R158: 13). Defendant timely appealed to the Utah 
Court of Appeals (R. 143). 
The appellate court unanimously agreed that each communication made in furtherance 
of a scheme to defraud constitutes a separate offense of communications fraud. See 
Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, ^  16,21 & 53 n. 10. The panel also unanimously agreed that 
the degree of an individual communications fraud offense is determined by the aggregate of 
all monies obtained or sought to be obtained in the scheme to defraud. See id. The panel 
split, however, on what constituted a single scheme to defraud. The majority held that a 
single scheme could involve multiple victims only if the victims were defrauded of the same 
thing, at the same time, in the same place, and by the same means. See id. at ffl[ 20-21. The 
dissent recognized that "a scheme to defraud" has a broader historical meaning, that is, an 
"overall design to defraud one or many by means of a common plan or technique." See id. 
at Tf 55 (Thorne, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). According 
to the dissent, a single scheme to defraud could include, as here, multiple victims defrauded 
by "one method with just a few minor variations." Id. at f 56 n.12 & see id. at ffl[ 55-56. 
This Court granted certiorari review to determine if Utah's Communications Fraud 
statute "allows aggregation of the amounts obtained in various fraudulent acts, accomplished 
as part of a broader pattern of criminal conduct, for purposes of determining the degree of 
offense associated with each separately charged communication." See Order Granting in 
Part Certiorari Review, dated February 16, 2005. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant does not contest that he defrauded his victims (R. 83-84, 119-26). The 
facts are relevant only in determining if one or multiple schemes exist. This summary is 
based on the parties' stipulation (Add. Q. 
On March 3, 2000, defendant met Elizabeth and Keith Fitzgerald at their home in 
South Jordan, Utah (R. 78). Defendant claimed he owned Classic Mortgage in St. George, 
Utah (id.). He offered to refinance their home through a quit claim deed, which he promised 
to deed back to them in two years (id.). He gave them a loan application (id.). He 
represented he would secure a credit check and appraisal for an up-front fee of $450.00 (id.). 
They agreed and paid him (id.). Defendant never performed the promised services (id.). He 
used the money to pay his personal bills (R. 84). 
In April 2000, defendant met Jeff Ahlstrom at his home in Provo, Utah (R. 76). 
Defendant claimed he was a co-owner of Classic Mortgage and claimed he had an ownership 
interest in another mortgage company, In-Time Funding (id.). He offered to refinance 
Ahlstrom's home (id.). He represented he would perform a credit check, a title search, and 
other necessary loan documentation for an up-front fee of $500.00 (id.). Ahlstrom agreed 
and paid him (R. 77). Defendant never performed the promised services (id.). He used the 
money to pay his personal bills (R. 84). 
On April 4,2000, defendant met Denny Moore at his home in West Jordan, Utah (R. 
77). Defendant claimed he was the owner of Classic Mortgage in St. George, Utah (id.). He 
offered to refinance Moore's home (id.). He represented he would secure a credit report and 
5 
a title search for an up-front fee of $450.00 (id.). Moore agreed and paid him (id.). 
Defendant never performed the promised services (id.). He used the money to pay his 
personal bills (R. 84). 
Three days later, on April 7,2000, defendant met Holly Anderson at her home in East 
Murray, Utah (R. 81). Defendant claimed he was the owner of Classic Mortgage in St. 
George, Utah (id.). He offered to refinance Anderson's home (id.). He represented he would 
perform a credit check and a title search for an up-front fee of $400.00 (id.). Anderson 
agreed and paid him (id.). Defendant never performed the promised services (id.). He used 
the money to pay his personal bills (R. 84). 
A week later, on April 14,2000, defendant met Marlon Anderson at his residence in 
South Jordan, Utah (R. 82). Defendant claimed he was the owner of a mortgage company 
(id.). Defendant offered to refinance Anderson's home (id.). He represented he would 
secure a credit check, a title report, and an appraisal for an up-front fee of $500.00 (id.). 
Anderson agreed and paid him (id.). Defendant never performed the promised services (id.). 
He used the money to pay his personal bills (R. 84). 
The next day, on April 15, 2000, defendant met Richard Brimley at his residence in 
Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 78). Defendant claimed he was the co-owner of Classic Mortgage 
and claimed he brokered loans with several other mortgage companies (id.) Defendant 
offered to finance Brimley's real estate project (R. 79). He represented he would secure a 
credit check, a title search, and an appraisal for an up-front fee of $500.00 (id.). Brimley 
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agreed and paid him (id.). Defendant never performed the promised services (R. 79). He 
used the money to pay his personal bills (R. 84). 
Two days later, on April 17,2000, defendant met Maurice and Louise Ohumukini at 
their residence in Salt Lake City (R. 79). Defendant claimed he was the owner of Classic 
Mortgage in St. George, Utah (id.). Defendant offered to refinance some property they 
owned (id.). He represented he would secure a credit check, a title search, and an appraisal 
for an up-front fee of $500.00 (id.). They agreed and paid him (id.). Defendant never 
performed the promised services (id.). He used the money to pay his personal bills (R. 84). 
Two weeks later, on May 5 2000, defendant met Halbert Gribble at his home in Salt 
Lake City, Utah (R. 77). Defendant claimed he was the owner of Classic Mortgage in St. 
George, Utah (id.). He offered to refinance Gribble's home to prevent its imminent 
foreclosure (R. 77-78). He represented he would secure a title search and appraisal for an 
up-front fee of $500.00 (R. 78). Gribble agreed and paid him (id.). Defendant never 
performed the promised services (id.). He used the money to pay his personal bills (R. 84). 
In June 2000, defendant met Mike and Holly Curtis at their home in Murray, Utah (R. 
80). Defendant claimed he owned a mortgage company and used a title company to help 
with his transactions (id.). He offered to refinance their home (id.). He gave them a loan 
application (id.). He represented he would perform a credit check and title search for an up-
front fee of $500.00 (id.). They agreed and paid him (id.). Defendant never performed the 
promised services (R. 80-81). He used the money to pay his personal bills (R. 84). 
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On June 5, 2000, defendant telephoned Karen Bush and discussed her need for 
refinancing to avoid imminent foreclosure (R. 79-80). On June 11, 2000, defendant met 
Karen Bush and her husband at their home in Tooele, Utah (R. 80). Defendant claimed he 
could refinance their home with his own money (id.). He represented he would perform a 
title search and an appraisal for an up-front fee of $600.00 (id.). They agreed and paid him 
(id.). Defendant never performed the promised services (id.). He used the money to pay his 
personal bills (R. 84). 
Sometime within this same period, defendant met Cliff Harris at his home in Draper, 
Utah (R. 81).2 Defendant claimed he was the owner of Classic Mortgage (id.). He offered 
to refinance Harris's home (id.). He represented he would secure a credit check, a title 
search, and an appraisal for an up-front fee of $500.00 (id.). Harris agreed and paid him (id.). 
Defendant never performed the promised services (id.). He used the fee to pay his personal 
bills (R. 84). 
Defendant was not the owner of or associated with Classic Mortgage or any other 
mortgage company (R. 83). Occasionally, one or two accomplices accompanied defendant 
in his meetings with the victims; at defendant's direction, one of them falsely pretended to 
be an appraiser in the meeting with Jeff Ahlstrom (R. 82). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's Communications Fraud statute recognizes that each communication made in 
furtherance of a scheme to defraud constitutes a separate offense. The statute directs that the 
2The parties' stipulation contains a typographical error: "On 13, 2000" (R. 81). 
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degree of an individual offense is determined by the aggregate of the monies obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme. These provisions are not at issue here. 
What constitutes a single scheme to defraud is at issue. The majority in Bradshaw 
concluded that defrauding multiple victims constitutes a single scheme only if the victims are 
defrauded of the same thing, at the same time, in the same place, and by the same means. 
Traditionally, however, a scheme to defraud is not so narrowly defined. Indeed, for over fifty 
years, courts have consistently recognized that a single scheme may include multiple victims 
defrauded of different things, at different times, in different places, and by different means 
as long as each fraud is part of the same design or plan. 
Here, defendant's design or plan was to deceive property owners into paying him a 
fictitious financing fee. The fact that he executed this plan with some minor variations does 
not negate the singular objective of the overall scheme. Consequently, he could permissibly 
be charged with eleven (the number of communications) second degree felony (the aggregate 
monies obtained) communications frauds. This Court should reverse Part II of the Bradshaw 
opinion and reinstate the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce the degree or 
number of the fraud counts. 
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ARGUMENT 
A SINGLE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD MAY INCLUDE MULTIPLE 
VICTIMS DEFRA UDED OF DIFFERENT THINGS, A T DIFFERENT 
TIMES, IN DIFFERENT PLACES, AND BY DIFFERENT MEANS AS 
LONG AS THE DECEPTIONS ARE PART OF THE SAME OVERALL 
FRAUDULENT PLAN OR DESIGN 
Utah's Communications Fraud statute reads in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money . . . by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: . . . 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the . . . money . . . obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; . . . 
(d) a second degree felony when the . . . money . . . obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; . . . 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) 
shall be measured by the total value of all. . . money . . . obtained or sought 
to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1). . . . 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 (West 2004) {Add. B). In State v. Bradshaw, the Utah Court 
of Appeals correctly and unanimously held that pursuant to subsection (5) of the statute, the 
number of individual fraud violations is determined by the number of communications made. 
5 ^ 2004 UT App 298,1ft 16,20 & 53.n.l0,99 P.3d 359 (i4Jrf.^[). The court of appeals also 
correctly and unanimously concluded that pursuant to subsection (2), the degree of an 
individual fraud violation is determined by the aggregate monies obtained or sought to be 
obtained through the scheme to defraud. See id. The panel split, however, on what 
constitutes a single scheme to defraud. 
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The majority held that when multiple victims are defrauded, the victims must be 
defrauded of the same item, at the same time, in the same place, and by the same means for 
the individual frauds to be part of the same scheme and subject to aggregation. See id. at ffl[ 
16 & 20. The majority opined a scenario which fit its criteria: 
Suppose that a defendant holds an "investment seminar" at a retirement home, 
where he gathers a dozen residents together, presents a slide show, and 
distributes brochures, etc., falsely detailing the financial rewards of a 
nonexistent "investment opportunity." The defendant then gathers $1,000 
checks from each of the residents attending the seminar. . . . Although 
involving multiple victims, the circumstances in such a scenario suggest a 
single scheme: each victim was deceived at the same time, in the same place, 
and with the same fraudulent representations as all the other victims. 
Zdl at Tf 20 n.7. 
The dissent disagreed with the majority's narrow interpretation of scheme to defraud. 
The dissent believed the term "scheme" should be accorded its historical and widely-
accepted meaning, that is, an "'overall design to defraud one or many by means of a common 
plan or technique.'" See id. at f 55 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Massey, 
48 F.3d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir. 1995)). Applying this definition to the facts, the dissent 
concluded that defendant "used one method with just a few minor variations" to defraud his 
victims and, consequently, the frauds were part of the same scheme and could be aggregated 
based on the amounts obtained in the entire scheme. See id. at f 56 & n. 12. 
The dissent is correct. For over fifty years, courts have consistently recognized that 
a single scheme to defraud may include multiple victims defrauded of different things, at 
different times, at different places, and by different means as long as the individual frauds 
are part of the same fraudulent plan. Section 76-10-1018 incorporates this same meaning. 
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A. A Single Scheme to Defraud Multiple Victims Is Defined By 
the Commonality of the Defendant's Role and the Techniques 
Used. 
As the dissent correctly recognized, the term "scheme to defraud" has an historical 
meaning which is still widely accepted. SeeBradshaw, 2004 UT App 298,155 (Thorne, J., 
dissenting). A scheme to defraud is an '"overall design to defraud one or many by means 
of a common plan or technique,'" Id, (emphasis in original) (quoting Massey, 48 F.3d at 
1566 and citing United States v. Rogers, 321 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003)). Similarly, 
scheme to defraud is defined as "a systemic plan; a connected or orderly arrangement of 
related concepts; an artful plot or plan, usually to deceive others." Black's Law Dictionary 
at 1372 (8th ed. 2004). These definitions embrace the concept accepted for over fifty years: 
a single scheme to defraud may involve the "defrauding of different people over an extended 
period of time, using different means and representations." See Owens v. United States, 221 
F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 1955). Indeed, courts recognize that a scheme's methods typically 
vary as the plan progresses, becomes more sophisticated, and the "assets of the more gullible 
victims are exhausted." See id, 
A single scheme to defraud may involve a multiplicity of ways and means of 
action and procedure. It may be such that the complete execution of it would 
involve the commission of more than one criminal offense. Mere details may 
be changed and the scheme remain the same. As the execution of the scheme 
(or the intention to devise the scheme) proceeds, new ways may be adopted or 
invented to effectuate the original design. The important thing is that the 
scheme, or the intention to devise it, shall remain the same. The variety of 
means which may be employed in the execution thereof is limited only by the 
ingenuity of the schemer. 
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Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 680-81 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941). 
Accord United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032,1037-38 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 858 
(1989); United States v. Mastelotto, 111 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1983); United States 
v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 945 (2nd Cir. 1961); United States v. MacAlpine, 129 F.2d 737, 
739-40 (7th Cir. 1942). 
Courts look to two critical factors in determining if a single scheme exists: (1) the 
"continuous and habitual use" of the same general fraudulent technique; and (2) the common 
role played by the defendant in the individual transactions. See Owens, 221 F.2d at 354-55. 
Other relevant factors include: the nature of the scheme involved, the class or other common 
identity of the victims, the class or other common connection of the perpetrators, the 
frequency and duration of the fraudulent transactions, and the "commonality of the time and 
goals." See Mastelotto, 111 F.2d at 1245 (recognizing that ultimately a single scheme may 
include all transactions "within the conceivable contemplation of a greedy mind"). Accord 
Crosby, 294 F.2d at 945; People v. First Meridian Planning Corp., 658 N.E.2d 1017,1021-
22(N.Y. 1995). 
Here, the dissent correctly discerned the commonality of defendant's technique and 
role. First, defendant "somehow gained access to . . . sensitive financial information" and 
from that "chose his victims" because they "wanted or needed" to finance property. 
Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, ^  56 (Thorne, J., dissenting). He approached the victims with 
"a similar or nearly identical story" and asked them for an up-front fee. Id. "Each of the 
eleven named victims gave Bradshaw the requested amount, never more than $600.00, after 
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which Bradshaw disappeared from their lives, never performing even one of the promised 
services." Id. The dissent correctly recognized that because defendant used the "same 
method or technique to defraud all of the victims, his conduct amounted to one 'scheme or 
artifice to defraud.5" See id. 
The dissent's analysis is consistent with well-established jurisprudence. For example, 
in United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 76-78 (1962), the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that a single scheme to defraud included multiple victims located throughout the 
United States. Sampson and his co-defendants, officers of a nationwide corporation, 
"deliberately planned and devised a well-integrated, long-range, and effective scheme for the 
use of propaganda, salesmen, and other techniques to soften up and then cheat their victims 
one by one" by promising to assist them with business loans. Id. at 77. Though the victims 
were not defrauded "at the same time, in the same place, and with the same fraudulent 
representations," see Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, \ 20 n.7, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that the 34 charged individual frauds were part of a single scheme to 
defraud. See Sampson, 371 U.S. at 77-78. Accord Bryan, 868 F.2d at 1033 & 1037-38 
(holding that only one unified scheme existed even though multiple victims were defrauded 
by multiple means at different times and in different locations); Mastelotto, 111 F.2d at 
1241-42 & 1244-45 (same). See also Owens, 221 F.2d at 353-54; MacAlpine, 129 F.2d at 
738-89 (same). 
Here, defendant had but one design or plan: to deceive property owners into paying 
him a fictitious fee. The scheme was not designed to obtain only one fee but, from its 
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inception, was designed to secure as many fictitious fees as possible. To carry out his 
fraudulent scheme, defendant used the same characteristic technique: 
(1) He initiated contact with property owners who needed real estate financing; 
(2) He met the owners and promised to obtain financing for them; 
(3) He said that for a fee, he would secure the necessary documentation; 
(4) After the fee was paid, he had no further contact with the owners. 
See Statement of Facts at 5-8. Some minor variations occurred. The fictitious fees ranged 
from $400.00 to $600.00. See id. The documents defendant promised to secure varied, but 
were all related to a mortgage loan. See id. Defendant typically met with a victim one-on-
one, but occasionally an accomplice or the victim's spouse was present. See id. The 
financing was primarily for the victims' homes, but occasionally another type of real estate 
was involved. See id. The locations and times of the meetings varied, but all occurred in a 
three-month period along the Wasatch Front. See id. Despite these minor variations, 
defendant played the same common role and used the same common technique in 
perpetrating each fraud as part of his overall plan to deceptively obtain fictitious fees. As a 
result, the degree of each individual offense was permissibly determined by the aggregate 
value of the scheme. 
The majority in Bradshaw disagreed. The majority erroneously focused on variations 
in the victims' circumstances—their location when approached by defendant, the presence 
or absence of their spouse, their reason for seeking financing, and the particular type of real 
estate involved—and concluded that "such disparate circumstances simply cannot fairly be 
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characterized as one 'scheme or artifice' under section [76-10-1810]."3 See Brads haw, 2004 
UT App 298, ^ f 20. But as properly recognized by the dissent, the variations in the victims' 
circumstances and/or defendant's technique were inconsequential because they did not 
change defendant's overall common plan to defraud property owners by deceiving them into 
paying him a fictitious fee. See id. at f 56. Accord Owens, 221 F.2d at 354-55 and cases 
cited, supra, at 12-14. 
B. The Majority Cites No Authority for its Unique Conclusion 
that a Single Scheme to Defraud Multiple Victims Occurs 
Only When the Victims Are Identically Defrauded. 
The majority's determination that multiple schemes existed derived from its erroneous 
conclusion that a single scheme to defraud occurs only when its victims are defrauded "at the 
same time, in the same place, and with the same fraudulent representations." See Bradshaw, 
2004 UT App 298, f 20 n.7. This conclusion was, in turn, the result of the majority's belief 
that charging multiple felonies in this case was "repugnant" because defendant would face 
"as much as a 165-year prison term for taking a total of $5,400 because he took it from 
eleven people."4 Id. atf 19. 
3The majority incorrectly cited "section 76-10-1603," which is part of Utah's 
RICO act. See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, ^  20. In context, it is clear that this is a 
typographical error and that the majority was referring to section 76-10-1801, the 
communications fraud statute. 
4The majority was incorrect. As the dissent correctly noted, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-401 (West 2004) (Add. B) limits the time actually served on consecutive felony offenses 
to thirty years. See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, \ 58 n.13 (Thome, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, in this case, defendant pled guilty to four reduced third degree felony charges 
and was sentenced to concurrent terms of zero-to-five-years imprisonment (R. 142). 
Consequently, defendant received a shorter actual sentence than he potentially faced even 
if he had been charged only with eleven class A misdemeanors, as the majority preferred. 
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To avoid this result, the majority limited the application of the communications fraud 
statute by creating an ambiguity in the statute where "no ambiguity exists." See id. at ffif 49-
53 (Thorne, J., dissenting). The panel had already unanimously agreed that the language and 
intent of subsections (2) and (5) was clear. See id. at Yf 16,20 & 53 n.10. Both subsections, 
however, referred to the "scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1)." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(2) & (5) {Add. B). Subsection (1) reads in pertinent part: 
Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to 
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations . . . . 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (emphasis added) (Add. B). 
Though not raised as an issue on appeal, the majority sua sponte concluded that 
subsection (l)'s use of "another" was ambiguous because the term could be singular or 
plural.5 See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, ffif 13-16. But see Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-
12(l)(b) (West 2004) (for purposes of statutory construction, "the singular number includes 
the plural, and the plural the singular") (Add. B). The majority also opined that "scheme" as 
used in subsection (1) was a "'highly elastic' and 'hardly a self-defining term.'"6 See id. at 
In the trial court, defendant initially claimed that "another" as used in subsection 
(1) limited aggregation to multiple frauds of a single victim (R. 88). See supra at 2. The 
trial court disagreed and correctly concluded that a single scheme could include multiple 
victims (R156: 3-4). On appeal, defendant abandoned his subsection (1) argument and 
argued that subsections (2) & (5) were alternative charging options which could not be 
combined. See Brief of Appellant at 11-12; Brief of Appellee at 9 n.3. 
6The majority's reliance on H.J. Inc. is misplaced. In that case, the Supreme 
Court addressed what conduct meets RICO's "pattern" requirement. 492 U.S. at 233. 
The Court found "no support... for the proposition . . . that predicate acts of racketeering 
may form a pattern only when they are part of separate illegal schemes." Id. at 236. It 
also refused to incorporate fraud's concept of "scheme to defraud" into RICO's pattern 
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If 17 (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241 n.3 (1989)). Citing 
these "ambiguities/' the majority concluded that it would go behind the plain language of the 
statute to consider "relevant policy" and to construe the statute "in favor of lenity" for 
defendant.7 See id. at fflf 18-19. But see id. at fflf 49-53 (Thome, J., dissenting). 
The majority held that, "[a]bsent explicit direction from the Legislature," it would not 
permit aggregation of "losses from each victim of multiple schemes [to be attributed] to all 
other victims." Id. at^ f 21 (emphasis in original). Consequently, the majority concluded that 
"even if 'another' as used in subsection (1) should be deemed to mean 'another or others,' 
the 'others' would have to be defrauded by means of a single scheme or artifice." Id. at \ 
16. The majority noted that limiting defendant's charges to multiple misdemeanors "aptly 
served... the Legislature's obvious policy to 'get tough' on communications fraud." Id. at 
Tf21. 
requirement because the term "scheme" appeared "nowhere in the language or legislative 
history of the [RICO] act." Id. at 241. In this context, the Court commented that, in any 
case, "the multiple scheme approach to identifying continuing criminal conduct [does not 
have] the advantage of lessening the uncertainty inherent in RICO's pattern component, 
for 'scheme' is hardly a self-defining term." Id. at 241 n.3. (citation and other internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
7The majority erred in treating "lenity" as a rule of construction. The rule of lenity 
"only serves as an aid for resolving ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. The rule 
comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, 
not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers." 
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 n. 10 (1981). In Utah, the concept has only 
been used to accord a defendant the lesser of two otherwise equally applicable 
punishments. See, e.g., State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969); State v. 
Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, \ 9, 14 P.3d 129; State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
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Rejecting that any ambiguity existed or that the consideration of "lenity" was 
appropriate, the dissent nevertheless agreed that the degree of individual communications 
frauds may be based on the aggregate value of the scheme only when the individual frauds 
are part of the same scheme. See id. at f 53 & n. 10 (Thorne, J., dissenting). The panel, 
however, split on what constituted a single scheme. 
As discussed in Subsection (A), supra, the dissent applied the historical definition of 
scheme to defraud—an "overall design to defraud one or many by means of a common plan 
or technique"—and concluded that defendant used the same plan or technique to defraud his 
victims albeit of slightly different things, by slightly different means, and at different times 
and places. See Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, ^ 54-56 (Thorne, J., dissenting). 
Consequently, the dissent would have allowed the degree of each of defendant's multiple 
offenses to be based on the aggregate value of the overall scheme. See id. at ^ | 57-59. 
In contrast, the majority found that multiple schemes existed because the "victims 
were deceived at different times, in different places, by different stories, and though different 
means." Id. at f 20. The majority, therefore, precluded aggregation. See id. at ^ 21. 
The majority cited no authority for its unique conclusion that a single scheme to 
defraud exists only if its victims are defrauded "at the same time, in the same place, and with 
the same fraudulent representations." See id. at f^f 20-21. Notwithstanding its lack of 
authority, the majority's language is similar to that found in the single larceny rule, a 
"common law doctrine which is rooted in antiquity [and] rests upon a specific analytical 
foundation." State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1981). Pursuant to the larceny rule, 
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"a single larcenous taking of property, whether owned by one or several individuals, will be 
treated as a single criminal offense." Id. The rule also encompasses the opposite: "'If 
different articles are taken from different owners at different times, the defendant is guilty 
of separate larcenies.5" Id. at 695-96 (quoting 2 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and 
Procedure, § 451 (1957)). The test to determine if one or multiple thefts should be charged 
is "'whether the evidence discloses one general intent or discloses separate and distinct 
intents. The particular facts and circumstances of each case determine this question. If there 
is but one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, even though there is a series of 
transactions, there is but one offense.'" State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980)). 
Despite the similarities in language, the Brads haw majority never claimed it was 
applying the single larceny rule. See Bradshaw. 2004 UT App 298, ^ flf 20-21. Nor could the 
rule apply here where the charge is fraud, not theft. See, e.g., State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 
183,195-96 (Utah 1987) ( recognizing that the single larceny rule applies only to theft crimes 
and holding the rule inapplicable to forgery); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 390-91 (Utah 
App. 1997) (same). See also State v. Rowell, 908 P.3d 1379, 1384-85 (N.M. 1995); State 
v. Boergadine, 107 P.2d 532, 540 (N.M. App. 2005) (same). 
In sum, the majority claims no authority for its holding that a single scheme to defraud 
requires that its victims be identically defrauded. Moreover, the holding is contrary to the 
widely-accepted meaning of "scheme to defraud." See Subsection (A), supra. When the 
correct definition of scheme to defraud is applied to the stipulated facts, the record 
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establishes that defendant devised a single scheme to deceive multiple property owners into 
paying him fictitious fees and used the same characteristic technique to obtain the fees. See 
Statement of Facts at 5-8 & discussion at 14-15. Consequently, the degree of the individual 
frauds was permissibly based on the aggregate value of the overall scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse Part II of the Bradshaw decision, 
reinstate the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce the degree or number of the 
communications frauds, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's decision. 
Respectfully submitted this /ff^-day of May, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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Background Defendant was charged with eleven 
counts of communications fraud and one count of 
pattern of racketeermg The Third District Court, 
Murray Department, Joseph C Fratto Jr , J , demed 
defendant's motion to quash the handover on the 
racketeermg charge and to reduce the degree of 
offense on the communication fraud charges, and 
defendant appealed 
Holdings The Court of Appeals, Orme, J , held 
that 
(1) defendant should have been charged only with 
eleven class A misdemeanors of communications 
fraud rather than eleven second degree felonies, 
(2) defendant was not involved in a "single scheme 
or artifice" with multiple victims, for purposes of 
determining whether State could aggregate the 
amounts taken from all of defendant's victims when 
charging defendant with communications fraud, and 
(3) defendant was not mvolved in an "enterprise" 
m violation of Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
Act (UPUAA) 
Reversed 
Thorne, J , dissented and filed opinion 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law <®^>1144 9 
110kll44 9 
Ordinarily in reviewing bmdover determinations, 
Court of Appeals is required to draw all reasonable 
evidentiary mferences in the state's favor 
[2] Criminal Law <®^>1144 9 
110kll44 9 
State was not entitled to have all reasonable 
evidentiary inferences drawn m its favor, m review 
of bmdover determination in prosecution of 
defendant on eleven counts of communications fraud 
and one count of pattern of racketeering, where 
there was no preliminary hearing and the State 
agreed to submit a written stipulation of the facts on 
the basis of which the propriety of the of the charges 
was to be evaluated 
[3] Criminal Law <£=> 1134(3) 
llOkl134(3) 
The determination of whether to bmd a cnmmal 
defendant over for trial is a question of law that is 
reviewed without deference to the trial court 
[4] Fraud <s^>69(2) 
184k69(2) 
In prosecution of defendant on eleven counts of 
communications fraud, State could not aggregate the 
amounts taken from all of defendant's eleven victims 
while simultaneously treating each communication 
with each victim as a separate offense, thereby 
attributing the aggregated amount taken to each of 
defendant's victims, and thus defendant should have 
been charged only with eleven class A 
misdemeanors rather than eleven second degree 
felonies, language of Communications Fraud statute 
indicated that the "aggregation" and "separate 
offense" provisions applied only to a single scheme 
or artifice, defendant was not involved m a smgle 
scheme with multiple victims but rather multiple 
schemes, and charging defendant with eleven second 
degree felonies was repugnant to motions of 
traditional fairness, as it would have subjected 
defendant to as much as a 165 year prison term for 
taking a total of $5,400 from eleven people 
U C A 1953, 76-10-1801 
[5] Statutes <S=>241(1) 
361k241(l) 
When there are two rational readings of a criminal 
statute, one harsher than the other, a court is to 
choose the harsher only when the Legislature has 
spoken in clear and definite language 
[6] Fraud <£^>69(2) 
184k69(2) 
Defendant was not involved in a "single scheme or 
artifice" with multiple victims, for purposes of 
determining whether, under the Communications 
Fraud statute, State could aggregate the amounts 
taken from all of defendant's eleven victims when 
charging defendant and thereby charge defendant 
with eleven second degree felony counts rather than 
eleven class A misdemeanor counts, where victims 
© 2005 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig U S Govt Works 
99 P 3d 359 
(Cite as: 99 P.3d 359, 2004 UT App 298) 
were deceived at different times, m different places, 
by different stories, and through different methods 
U C A 1953, 76-10-1801 
[7] Statutes <®^184 
361kl84 
[7] Statutes <§^ =>189 
361kl89 
[7] Statutes <@ >^215 
361k215 
When it is obvious that an attempt to give a statute 
umversal and literal application leads to incongruous 
results which were never mtended, the statute should 
be considered in the light of its background and 
purpose, together with other aspects of the law 
which have a bearmg on the problem mvolved 
[8] Criminal Law <®^>240 
110k240 
To bmd a defendant over for trial, the State must 
show probable cause at a preliminary hearing by 
producing evidence sufficient to support a 
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed 
and that the defendant committed it, which means 
the State must produce believable evidence of all the 
elements of the crime charged 
[9] Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
<S^ =>104 
319Hkl04 
[9] Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
<®^>105 
319Hkl05 
To establish probable cause that a defendant violated 
Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (UPUAA) 
such that the defendant can be bound over for trial, 
the State must produce believable evidence that (1) 
defendant was engaged in a pattern of unlawful 
activity, and (2) defendant was involved m an 
enterprise U C A 1953, 76-10-1603(1, 2) 
[10] Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations <®=;:>105 
319Hkl05 
Defendant was not involved in an "enterprise" in 
violation of Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act 
(UPUAA), and thus could not be bound over for 
trial m a prosecution in which the parties stipulated 
to the pertinent facts in lieu of a preliminary 
hearing, where State's information merely parroted 
the language of the UPUAA and offered no insight 
into State's theory of the alleged enterprise, 
stipulation's reference to the fact that two of 
defendant's acquaintances witnessed some of 
defendant's misrepresentations and may have 
participated on one occasion was not suggestive of 
an ongoing organization or that defendant and his 
acquaintances functioned as a continuing unit, 
stipulation failed to include any facis suggestmg that 
defendant used the proceeds from his fraudulent 
activity to mvest or gam an interest m an enterprise, 
and stipulation instead stated proceeds were used to 
pay defendant's personal bills U C A 1953, 
76-10-1603 
[11] Courts <S==>97(5) 
106k97(5) 
Because Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act 
(UPUAA) was modeled after, and its provisions are 
nearly identical to, the Federal Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Utah courts 
looks to federal case law for guidance on issues of 
whether a defendant was mvolved in a pattern of 
unlawful activity or an enterprise 18 U S C A § 
1962, U C A 1953, 76-10-1603 
[12] Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations ®^105 
319Hkl05 
An "association in fact enterprise" for purposes of 
Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (UPUAA) 
is proved by evidence of an ongoing orgamzation, 
formal or informal, and by evidence that the various 
associates function as a continuing unit 
U C A 1953, 76-10-1603 
[13] Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations <®^>105 
319Hkl05 
While a criminal defendant may be both an 
"individual" and an "enterprise" for purposes of 
Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (UPUAA), 
a cnmmal defendant's status as an "individual," 
without more, does not establish a violation of 
UPUAA U C A 1953, 76-10-1603 
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Organizations Act (RICO) prosecutions, showing 
that the defendant used fraudulently obtained income 
in the proscribed manner is part of the government's 
prima facie case 18 U S C A § 1962 
[15] Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations <@^3 
319Hk3 
Smce Congress intended civil Federal Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Orgamzations Act (RICO) 
plaintiffs to prove the same elements which the 
Government must prove in a cnmmal case, civil 
RICO cases are illustrative of the required elements 
for a prima facie case of racketeering 18 U S C A 
§ 1962 
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Lake City, for Appellant 
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**1 Defendant Brooks Bradshaw was charged with 
eleven counts of communications fraud, second 
degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann § 
76-10-1801 (2003), and one count of pattern of 
unlawful activity (racketeering), a second degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann § 76- 10-1603 
(2003) Bradshaw filed a motion to quash the 
bmdover on the racketeering charge and to reduce 
the degree of offense of the communications fraud 
charges The trial court denied his motion in both 
respects We reverse 
BACKGROUND 
**2 In lieu of a preliminary hearing, which 
Bradshaw waived, the parties submitted a written 
stipulation setting forth the following facts Over a 
period of several months, Bradshaw defrauded 
eleven persons of amounts ranging from $400 to 
$600 each, for a total of $5,400 Most of the 
victims were either attempting to refinance 
mortgages on their residences or in the process of 
foreclosure After identifying his victims, Bradshaw 
falsely represented himself as the owner of various 
mortgage companies Bradshaw then promised to 
assist the victims m obtaining refinancing or 
avoiding foreclosure in exchange for various fees, 
ostensibly to be used for appraisals, title searches, 
and credit checks Brett Kennedy and William 
Thomas, two of Bradshaw's former coworkers m 
the appraisal business, [FN1] witnessed some of the 
fraudulent activity, and Bradshaw asked Thomas to 
falsely represent himself as an appraiser to one of 
the victims Bradshaw took the victims' money, but 
never performed any of the promised services 
Bradshaw spent the money paying his personal 
expenses 
FN1 Based on complaints unrelated to those at 
issue in this case, the Department of Commerce 
had earlier revoked Bradshaw's appraiser's license 
due to Bradshaw's practice of fraudulently inflating 
property values 
**3 The State charged Bradshaw with eleven 
counts of communications fraud, second degree 
felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann § 
76-10-1801 (2003), and one count of pattern of 
unlawful activity (racketeering), a second degree 
felony m violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-10-1603 
(2003) [FN2] Bradshaw filed a motion to quash the 
bmdover on the racketeering charge and to reduce 
the degree *362 of offense of the communications 
fraud charges 
FN2 As a convenience to the reader, and because 
there have been no significant amendments, we cite 
to the current version of the Utah Code rather than 
the version in effect when Bradshaw was charged, 
except as otherwise noted 
**4 As to the racketeering charge, Bradshaw 
argued that the State failed to show probable cause 
that he was engaged in an "enterprise" as required 
by subsections (1) and (2) of section 76-10-1603 
As to the communications fraud charges, Bradshaw 
argued that the State misconstrued the statute in 
charging him with eleven second degree felonies In 
determining the degree of the offense, the statute 
allows for aggregation of "the total value of all 
money obtained by the scheme or artifice " Utah 
Code Ann § 76-10- 1801(2) In addition, the 
statute provides that "[e]ach separate communication 
is a separate act and offense of communication 
fraud " Id § 76-10-1801(5) The State first 
aggregated the amount taken from all of Bradshaw's 
victims, which amounted to $5,400, surpassing the 
threshold for a second degree felony See id § 
© 2005 Thomson/West No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
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76-10-1801(l)(d). The State then treated each 
communication as a separate offense and attributed 
the entire $5,400 to each of Bradshaw's victims, 
charging Bradshaw with eleven second degree 
felonies. Bradshaw argued that the State should not 
be permitted to avail itself of both charging schemes 
at once. In other words, under Bradshaw's view the 
State should be required to choose whether to 
aggregate the amounts taken from Bradshaw's 
victims, or, in the alternative, to treat each of 
Bradshaw's communications as separate offenses. 
Thus, Bradshaw contended that he should have been 
charged with either eleven class A misdemeanors or 
one second degree felony. 
**5 The trial court denied Bradshaw's motion, 
concluding, first, that the State could prove the 
"enterprise" element of racketeering even if 
Bradshaw only used the money for personal 
expenses, and second, that the State could 
legitimately charge Bradshaw with eleven second 
degree felonies under section 76-10-1801. 
**6 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Bradshaw pled 
guilty to four counts of attempted communications 
fraud, third degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-4-102(3) (2003), reserving his right to appeal the 
trial court's denial of his motion. See generally 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988). The trial court accepted the pleas 
and the remaining charges were dropped. A 
judgment of conviction was entered on four counts 
of attempted communications fraud, and Bradshaw 
appealed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
**7 Bradshaw raises two issues on appeal. First, 
Bradshaw argues that the State's charging scheme is 
contrary to the language and purpose of Utah's 
Communications Fraud statute. Second, Bradshaw 
argues that the trial court erroneously denied his 
motion to quash the bindover on the racketeering 
charge because the stipulated facts do not establish 
that Bradshaw was engaged in an "enterprise." 
[1][2][3] **8 Both issues on appeal present 
questions of statutory interpretation. "The proper 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law." 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,H 17, 977 
P.2d 1201. Therefore, "we accord no deference to 
the legal conclusions of the [trial] court but review 
them for correctness." Id. Likewise, "[t]he 
determination of whether to bind a criminal 
defendant over for trial is a question of law.... [W]e 
review that determination without deference to the 
court below." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,K 8, 20 
P.3d 300. [FN3] 
FN3. The dissenting opinion, in its footnote 1, 
relies on Clark, among other cases, in criticizing 
"the bindover standard applied by the majority." 
Specifically, the dissent discusses at some length 
the notion that at a preliminary hearing, " ' "the 
magistrate must view all evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." 
' " Clark, 2001 UT 9 at 1 10, 20 P.3d 300 
(citations omitted). Ordinarily in reviewing 
bindover determinations, "we are," as stated by the 
dissent "required to draw all reasonable evidentiary 
inferences in the state's favor." 
The problem in this case~and it is rather unique in 
our experience—is that there was no preliminary 
hearing and there was no evidence introduced from 
which inferences may be drawn. Instead, the State 
agreed to submit a written stipulation of facts on 
the basis of which the propriety of the charges was 
to be evaluated. While this procedure no doubt 
saved the State the trouble of calling witnesses and 
presenting evidence, the decision to bind Bradshaw 
over must be evaluated with reference to the facts 
recited within the four corners of the stipulation. 
Having forgone the option of presenting evidence, 
the State is necessarily not in a position to benefit 
from evidentiary inferences. The State opted for 
the peculiar procedure employed in this case, and it 
is not entitled to be rescued from the factual 
limitations resulting from its reliance on a written 
stipulation instead of evidence presented at a 
normal preliminary hearing. 
*363 ANALYSIS 
I. Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
**9 "When interpreting statutes, our primary goal 
is to evince 'the true intent and purpose of the 
Legislature.' " State ex rel. Division of Forestry, 
Fire & State Lands v. Tooele Co., 2002 UT 8,U 10, 
44 P.3d 680 (quoting Jensen v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). 
Generally, the " 'best evidence' of a statute's 
meaning [is] the plain language of the act." Id. "In 
reading the language of an act, moreover, we seek 
'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and 
meaningful,' and we therefore 'presume the 
legislature use[d] each term advisedly and ... 
according to its ordinary meaning.' " Id. 
(alterations and ellipsis in original) (citations 
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omitted). This means that "the expression of one 
[term] should be interpreted as the exclusion of 
another ... [and that] omissions in statutory language 
should 'be taken note of and given effect.' " Biddle 
v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,t 14, 993 
P.2d 875 (quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217, 219 
(1973)). 
**10 However, if the plain language of a statute is 
ambiguous, "unreasonably confused, [or] 
inoperable," we will "seek guidance" from other 
sources, including "legislative history and relevant 
policy considerations." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah 1996) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Finally, 
"[Utah statutory] provisions and all proceedings 
under them are to be liberally construed with a view 
to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (2000). 
II. Communications Fraud 
**11 Bradshaw argues that the State should not be 
permitted to aggregate the amounts taken from all of 
his victims while simultaneously treating each 
communication as a separate offense, thereby 
attributing the aggregated amount of $5,400 to each 
of Bradshaw's eleven victims. 
**12 Pursuant to the rules of statutory construction 
outlined above, we look first to the language of the 
statute. The relevant provisions of Utah's 
Communications Fraud statute are as follows: 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from 
another money, property, or anything of value by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, 
and who communicates directly or indirectly with 
any person by any means for the purpose of 
executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is 
guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than 
$1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than 
$5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $5,000.... 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense 
under Subsection (1) shall be measured by the total 
value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice 
described in Subsection (1).... 
(5) Each separate communication made for the 
purpose of executing or concealing a scheme or 
artifice described in Subsection *364 (1) is a 
separate act and offense of communication fraud. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003). 
**13 In the trial court's view, the validity of the 
State's charging methodology hinged on the 
interpretation of the word "another" in subsection 
(1) of section 76-10-1801, which refers to "any 
scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
[money] from another ... by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses." Id. (emphasis added). The 
trial court reasoned that if "another" is interpreted in 
the singular, a "scheme or artifice" would appear to 
contemplate only one victim; but, on the other 
hand, if "another" is interpreted to include the 
plural, then "scheme or artifice" could involve 
multiple victims. 
**14 The trial court concluded that the term 
"another" should be interpreted to include the plural 
form "others" and thus that the term "scheme or 
artifice" could include multiple victims. 
Consequently, the trial court concluded that the 
defrauding of all eleven of Bradshaw's victims must 
be treated as a single scheme or artifice under the 
statute. 
[4] **15 The trial court's interpretation of the 
statute was erroneous. While it is generally true 
that "[t]he singular number includes the plural, and 
the plural the singular," Utah Code Ann. § 
68-3-12(l)(a) (2000), the opposite is true when 
"such construction would be inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the Legislature or repugnant to the 
context of the statute [.]" Id. § 68-3-12(1). See also 
Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Salt Lake City, 14 Utah 
2d 171, 380 P.2d 721, 724 (1963) (M[I]t is quite 
generally held that where a sensible interpretation 
and application of the statute so requires the 
singular includes the plural and vice versa.") 
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(emphasis added). 
**16 The language of the statute indicates that the 
"aggregation" and "separate offense" provisions 
apply only to a single scheme or artifice. Thus, in 
order to uphold the trial court, subsection (2) 
permits aggregation of the total value of money 
"obtained ... by the scheme or artifice described in 
Subsection (1)," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(2) 
(2003) (emphasis added), while subsection (5) 
permits "[e]ach separate communication made for 
the purpose of executing or concealing a scheme or 
artifice described in Subsection (1)" to be treated as 
separate offenses. Id. § 76-10- 1801(5) (emphasis 
added). See State ex rel. Division of Forestry, Fire 
& State Lands v. Tooele Co., 2002 UT 8,K 10, 44 
P.3d 680 (We " 'presume the legislature use[d] each 
term advisedly and ... according to its ordinary 
meaning.' ") (alteration and ellipsis in original) 
(citation omitted). Thus, even if "another" as used 
in subsection (1) should be deemed to mean 
"another or others," [FN4] the "others" would have 
to be defrauded by means of a single scheme or 
artifice. [FN5] 
FN4. When the Legislature wished to be clear that 
it intended multiple-rather than singular-
implications, it was able to say so quite clearly. 
Thus, in subsection (5), it clearly stated that if 
multiple communications are made, even if in 
furtherance of a single scheme or artifice, "[e]ach 
separate communication" constitutes a distinct 
communications fraud offense. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801(5) (2003). 
FN5. Selectively adhering to the notion that the 
"singular includes the plural," the State agrees with 
the trial court that "another" as used in subsection 
(1) should be construed to mean "another or others 
" and thus that the losses of multiple victims of a 
single scheme can be aggregated. In contrast, the 
trial court did not suggest, and the State does not 
argue on appeal, that the term "scheme or artifice" 
as used in subsections (1), (2), and (5) is similarly 
intended to mean "scheme or schemes or artifice or 
artifices " rather than a single "scheme or artifice." 
Perhaps the State is merely reserving this argument 
for a case where such a view would allow it to 
apply the aggregation and "separate offense" 
provisions to a criminal defendant who, for 
example, perpetrates a stock fraud, a real estate 
swindle, and a pyramid scheme all in the same 
general time period. There is no obvious bar to 
such an approach if the singular invariably includes 
the plural. 
**17 The United States Supreme Court recognized 
that the word "scheme" is "highly elastic" and 
"hardly a self-defining term." H.J. Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241 n. 3, 
109 S.Ct. 2893, 2901 n. 3, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989) 
Rather, "[a] 'scheme' is in the eye of the 
beholder, since whether a scheme exists depends on 
the level of generality at which criminal activity is 
viewed." Id. Indeed, the State acknowledges in this 
case that Utah trial courts have *365 "go[ne] both 
ways" in interpreting section 76-10-1603. See 2A 
Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 45:02, at 17 (6th ed. 2000) 
("[Legislation is ambiguous ... when well-informed 
persons may reasonably disagree as to its 
meaning."). 
[5] **18 However, the United States Supreme 
Court has directed that " 'ambiguity concerning the 
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in 
favor of lenity.' " Simpson v. United States, 435 
U.S. 6, 14, 98 S.Ct. 909, 914, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 
(1978) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 
336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 
(1971)). Accord United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 
576, 587 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2531 n. 10, 69 
L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (recognizing that the "rule of 
lenity," as a "guide to statutory construction ... 
serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity"). Thus, 
" '[w]hen there are two rational readings of a 
criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are 
to choose the harsher only when [the Legislature] 
has spoken in clear and definite language.' " 
Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 123 S.Ct. 
1057, 1068, 154 L.Ed.2d 991 (2003) (quoting 
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60, 
107 S.Ct. 2875, 2881, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987)). 
Utah courts have also recognized the concept of 
lenity. See State v. Barker, 624 P.2d 694, 696 
(Utah 1981) ("[It is] the presupposition of our law to 
resolve doubts in the enforcement of the penal code 
against the imposition of a harsher punishment."). 
**19 In addition, "relevant policy considerations" 
may be taken into account in construing an 
ambiguous statute. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Utah 1996) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). As Bradshaw 
points out in his brief, charging him with eleven 
second degree felonies, each carrying a prison 
sentence of one to fifteen years, see Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 76-3-203(2) (1999), [FN6] subjects him to as 
much as a 165-year prison term for taking a total of 
$5,400 because he took it from eleven people Such 
a charging system is repugnant to notions of 
traditional fairness and, additionally, does not 
comport with a stated purpose of the Utah Criminal 
Code, which is to "[prescribe penalties which are 
proportionate to the seriousness of offenses " Utah 
Code Ann § 76-1-104(3) (2003) See also Utah 
Code Ann § 76-1-106 (2003) ("All provisions of 
this code and offenses defined by the laws of this 
state shall be construed accordmg to the fair import 
of their terms to promote justice and to effect the 
objects of the law and general purposes of [the Utah 
Criminal Code ]"), 2A Norman J Singer, Statutes 
and Statutory Construction § 45 12, at 81-82 (6th 
ed 2000) ("It [is] a golden rule of statutory 
interpretation that, when one of several possible 
interpretations produces an unreasonable result, that 
is a reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor 
of another which would produce a reasonable 
result ") 
FN6 Although section 76-3-203 has recently been 
amended, this particular provision remains 
unchanged See Utah Code Ann § 76-3- 203(2) 
(2003) 
[6] **20 In the mstant case, the stipulation 
establishes multiple schemes, not a single scheme 
with multiple victims See supra note 5 The 
victims were deceived at different times, in different 
places, by different stories, and through different 
methods The victims were approached in different 
cities, including Salt Lake City, West Jordan, South 
Jordan, Tooele, and Draper The victims were also 
promised different combinations of services, 
including title searches, credit reports, and property 
appraisals Only some of the victims were facing 
imminent foreclosure Although most of the victims 
were interested m refinancing their residences, 
Bradshaw offered to arrange the purchase of one 
victim's store and offered to help another victim 
with a "real estate project he was attempting to 
complete " On some of the occasions, Bradshaw 
was accompanied by at least one former coworker 
Bradshaw approached some of the victims as 
couples and other times approached them 
individually The State attempts to generalize this 
series of schemes into a single scheme See H J 
Inc v Northwestern Bell Tel Co , 492 U S 229, 
241 n 3, 109 S Ct 2893, 2901 n 3, 106 L Ed 2d 
195 (1989) ("[W]hether a scheme exists depends on 
the level of generality at which criminal activity is 
viewed ,f) However, such disparate circumstances 
simply cannot *366 fairly be characterized as one 
"scheme or artifice" under section 76-10-1603 
[FN7] 
FN7 In contrast, a single scheme with multiple 
victims would likely be established by the facts of 
the following scenario Suppose that a defendant 
holds an "investment seminar" at a retirement 
home, where he gathers a dozen residents together, 
presents a slide show, and distributes brochures, 
etc , falsely detailing the financial rewards of a 
nonexistent "investment opportunity " The 
defendant then gathers $1,000 checks from each of 
the residents attending the seminar While the 
investment scam just described involved more than 
one victim, we think it could nevertheless be 
characterized as one "scheme" under section 
76-10-1603 Although involving multiple victims, 
the circumstances in such a scenario suggest a 
single scheme each victim was deceived at the 
same time, m the same place, and with the same 
fraudulent representations as all the other victims 
[7] **21 The State argues that "it is the prerogative 
of the legislature to define crimes and punishments" 
and that it "may impose harsher penalties on certain 
crimes even if logic does not compel them to do so " 
The pomt is well made However, m this case, the 
Legislature's obvious policy to "get tough" on 
communications fraud is aptly served under the 
interpretation of section 76-10-1801 embraced here 
As previously noted, the statute allows the State to 
treat each communication in furtherance of a scheme 
or artifice as a separate offense and may, m 
appropriate cases, allow the State to aggregate 
money taken from each individual victim of a single, 
coherent scheme for purposes of making the crimes 
second degree felonies-stern enforcement by any 
standard Absent explicit direction from the 
Legislature, however, we will not read the statute as 
additionally allowing the State to attribute the losses 
from each victim of multiple schemes to all other 
victims See Jensen v Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc, 679 P2d 903, 906-07 (Utah 1984) ("The 
meaning of a part of an act should harmonize with 
the purpose of the whole act The Legislature can 
hardly have mtended that a construction should be 
placed on [one section] that would result in harsh 
and unfair results m applying the remainder of the 
Act ") As stated by our Supreme Court 
It is not always possible to foresee and prescribe 
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... all situations to which [a statute] might apply. 
Attempts to give [a statute] universal and literal 
application frequently lead to incongruous results 
which were never intended. When it is obvious 
that this is so, the statute should ... be considered 
in the light of its background and ... purposef,] 
together with other aspects of the law which have 
a bearing on the problem involved. 
Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915, 
916 (1964). 
**22 In light of the language and relevant policy 
underlying Utah's Communications Fraud statute, 
the State may not attribute the aggregated amount of 
$5,400 to each individual victim of Bradshaw's 
entire course of fraudulent activity. Therefore, at 
least on the basis of the facts stipulated to by the 
State, Bradshaw's motion to reduce the degree of 
the charged offenses on the communications fraud 
counts should have been granted. 
III. Racketeering 
[8][9] **23 Bradshaw argues that the State failed to 
establish probable cause that he was engaged in an 
"enterprise" as required by Utah's Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity Act (UPUAA). See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10- 1603(1), (2) (2003). Bradshaw is 
correct that "[t]o bind a defendant over for trial, the 
State must show 'probable cause' at a preliminary 
hearing" by producing evidence sufficient "to 
support a reasonable belief that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it." 
[FN8] State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,lffl 10,16, 20 P.3d 
300 (citations omitted). Accord State v. Robinson, 
2003 UT App 1,H 5, 63 P.3d 105. This means that 
the State must produce " 'believable evidence of all 
the elements of the crime charged,' " Clark, 2001 
UT 9 at \ 15, 20 P.3d 300 (citations omitted), i.e., 
"that (1) [Bradshaw *367 was] engaged in a pattern 
of unlawful activity and (2) [Bradshaw was] 
involved in an enterprise." Holbrook v. Master 
Prot. Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 302 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) 
Accord State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 636 
(1988) (holding State must prove both elements to 
prevail on racketeering charge). 
FN8. As previously noted, for better or worse the 
parties stipulated to the pertinent facts in lieu of a 
preliminary hearing. In the absence of a 
preliminary hearing, and in light of the fact that the 
parties anticipated and invited the court to rule on 
Bradshaw's motion to quash the bindover based on 
the stipulated facts, the State was required to 
satisfy its probable cause burden via the 
stipulation. See supra note 3. 
[10] [11] **24 Bradshaw essentially concedes that 
the State demonstrated the required probable cause 
on the "pattern of unlawful activity" element of 
racketeering. Therefore, we address only the 
second prong of the racketeering charge, i.e., 
whether the stipulation contained facts showing that 
Bradshaw was involved in an "enterprise" as 
required by subsections (1) and (2) of section 
76-10-1603. [FN9] It clearly did not. 
FN9. Those subsections provide: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received 
any proceeds derived, whether directly or 
indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in 
which the person has participated as a principal, to 
use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that 
income, or the proceeds of the income, or the 
proceeds derived from the investment or use of 
those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest 
in, or the establishment or operation of, any 
enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern 
of unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly 
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any 
enterprise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (2003). 
Because UPUAA was modeled after, and its 
provisions are nearly identical to, the Federal 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO), "we look to ... federal case law for 
guidance on these issues." Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. 
Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 947 n. 5 
(Utah 1996). See also State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 
101 n. 1 (Utah 1988) ("The Utah Act and similar 
provisions in other states have been referred to as 
'Little RICO' Acts because they were modeled 
after the federal 'RICO' statute!.]"). 
The RICO analogs to subsections (1) and (2) of 
UPUAA provide: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has 
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, 
from a pattern of racketeering activity or through 
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person 
has participated as a principal within the meaning 
of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or 
invest, directly or indirectly, amy part of such 
income, or the proceeds of such income, in 
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment 
or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged 
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce.... 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a 
pattern of racketeering activity or through 
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collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or 
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or 
control of any enterprise which is engaged m, or 
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce 
18 U SC A § 1962 (West 2000) 
As defined in UPUAA, " '[enterprise* means any 
individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, 
corporation, business trust, association, or other 
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity, and 
includes illicit as well as licit entities " Utah Code 
Ann § 76-10-1602(1) (1999) 
The RICO definition of "enterprise" is almost 
identical to its UPUAA counterpart, and provides 
'[Enterprise' includes any individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal 
entity, and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity "18 
U S C A § 1961(4) (West 2000) 
**25 While the stipulation ably detailed the facts 
relative to the communications fraud charges, 
allowing for meaningful evaluation of those counts, 
it all but ignored the racketeering count Neither the 
cnmmal information nor the stipulated facts set forth 
any cognizable theory of an enterprise This 
approach was rejected in State v Bell, 770 P 2d 100 
(Utah 1988), [FN10] where the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that "[t]he existence of an 'enterprise' is 
essential for the crimes defined by [UPUAA]" 
because the UPUAA crime "is more than just the 
substantive offense constituting the racketeering 
activity, it consists of a particular relationship 
between the racketeering activity and an 
enterprise Thus, proof of the existence of an 
enterprise and its relationship to the racketeering 
activity is essential for a conviction under 
[UPUAA] " Id at 103 n 2 See also Richmond v 
Nationwide Cassel LP, 52 F 3d 640, 645-46 (7th 
Cir 1995) (dismissing RICO complaint because "a 
nebulous, open-ended description of the enterprise 
does not sufficiently identify this essential element 
of the RICO offense"), *368 Gore v Eichholz, No 
CV-491-084, 1992 WL 96316, *2, 1992 U S Dist 
LEXIS 5998, at **7, 18 (S D Ga April 24, 1992) 
(dismissing RICO claim where complaint failed to 
"identify [an] enterprise precisely, describe its 
structure, or explain the [defendants' role m the 
pattern of racketeering activity associated with the 
enterprise") 
FN 10 Several of the cases referred to m this 
opinion were decided under Utah s former 
antiracketeermg statute, known as the 
Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise 
Act," or "RICE " See State v Thompson, 751 
P2d 805, 815 n 3 (Utah Ct App 1988) (noting 
that RICE was amended m 1987 and renamed the 
"Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act"), rev'd on other 
grounds, 810 P 2d 415 (Utah 1991) The 
provisions at issue in the instant case are 
substantially the same as they were under RICE, 
and thus the authority cited that refers to RICE 
applies with equal force here 
**26 The facts of Bell are illustrative In that 
case, the defendant, who owned a convenience 
store, was convicted of racketeering "by means of 
drug trafficking" in his store Bell, 770 P 2d at 
101 The defendant appealed, claiming that the 
State's bill of particulars "was not adequately 
detailed to put him on notice of the alleged factual 
basis for the element of an enterprise " Id at 105 
Regardmg the enterprise element, the State's bill of 
particulars recited "[The enterprise consists of the 
trafficking [sic] in controlled substances and 
investing the proceeds " Id (second alteration in 
original) The Court responded "By no stretch of 
the imagination could th[is] single enigmatic 
sentence be construed as containing sufficient 
factual information to describe the State's actual 
theories of [the enterprise] element of the crime, 
much less to permit [defendant] to prepare his 
defense on this element " Id Thus, the Court 
reversed the defendant's convictions and remanded 
for a new trial See id at 111 
[12] **27 While admittedly in a different 
procedural posture than the instant case, [FN 11] the 
Court's observations m Bell are applicable here 
The State's information merely parrots the language 
of UPUAA and offers no insight into the State's 
theory of the alleged enterprise Likewise, the 
stipulation nowhere mentions the word "enterprise " 
On appeal, the State postulates that its theory of an 
enterprise is an "association m fact" between 
Bradshaw and his two former coworkers An 
"association in fact" enterprise "is proved by 
evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or 
informal, and by evidence that the various associates 
function as a continuing umt " State v Hutchings, 
950 P2d 425, 431 (Utah Ct App 1997) The 
stipulation's vague references to the fact that two of 
Bradshaw's acquaintances witnessed some of the 
misrepresentations and may have participated on one 
occasion is not suggestive of an "ongoing 
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organization" or that Bradshaw and his so-called 
accomplices "function[ed] as a continuing unit " Id. 
See Clark, 2001 UT 9 at fl 15, 20 P 3d 300 (holding 
that to satisfy probable cause standard at preliminary 
hearing, State must produce " 'believable evidence 
of all the elements of the crime charged' ") 
(citations omitted) See also State v. Rael, 111 
N M 347, 981 P 2d 280, 284 (Ct App 1999) 
("Sporadic, temporary criminal alliances do not 
constitute an enterprise within the meanmg of the 
[state RICO] act "), cert, denied, 111 N M 390, 
981 P 2d 1208 (1999) Cf, eg., United States v. 
Phillips, 239 F 3d 829, 844 (7th Cir ) (affirming the 
existence of an enterprise when detailed evidence 
showed "a long-established street gang" that was 
"involved in the sale of illegal drugs" and was "an 
ongomg organization with members who functioned 
as a continuing unit" with "a definite structure with 
a distmct ranking of members"), cert, denied, 534 
U S 884, 122 S Ct 191, 151 L Ed 2d 134 (2001), 
State v. McGrath, 749 P 2d 631, 637 (Utah 1988) 
(fmdmg sufficient evidence to support the existence 
of an enterprise where defendant and accomplice 
"had an ongoing association m fact for the purpose 
of making money from the sale of controlled 
substances", "[defendant regularly 'fronted' drugs 
to [his accomplice], who m turn sold them to 
individual users", and defendant and his accomplice 
"ke[pt] written accounts of their numerous 
transactions [which] showed seventy-four 
transactions between [the two]"). 
FN 11 The State is done no disservice here by 
analogizing to Bell The Court m Bell was called 
upon to decide whether the defendant was "given 
sufficiently detailed notice of the charges against 
him to enable him to prepare a defense," Bell, 770 
P 2d at 101, whereas here we must determine 
whether the State set forth in the stipulation 
sufficient facts to support a reasonable belief that 
Bradshaw was engaged in an enterprise See State 
v Clark, 2001 UT 9,ffl[ 10,16, 20 P 3d 300 If 
vague, summary allegations regarding the existence 
of an enterprise are insufficient to put a defendant 
on notice of the charges against him, they are 
necessarily insufficient to meet the higher threshold 
of probable cause 
[13] **28 Likewise, the State misunderstands 
UPUAA insofar as it suggests it need *369 only 
point to the existence of an "individual" to satisfy 
the "enterprise" element It is true that a criminal 
defendant may be both an "individual" [FN12] and 
an "enterprise" under subsections (1) and (2) of 
section 76-10-1602 See State v. Hutchings, 950 
P 2d at 433, 435 (holding that " 'the liable "person" 
and the "enterprise" can be the same entity' " under 
subsections (1) and (2) of section 76-10-1603) 
(quotmg United States v. DiCaro, 111 F 2d 1314, 
1320 (7th Cir 1985), cert, denied, 475 U S 1081, 
106 S Ct 1458, 89 L Ed 2d 716 (1986)) However, 
the State cites no authority suggesting that a criminal 
defendant's status as an "individual," without more, 
establishes a violation of UPUAA See Bell, 770 
P 2d at 103 n 2 ("An enterprise may consist of an 
individual, corporation, or other business entity, or 
any de facto association, and may be either a legal 
or an illicit entity ") (emphasis added) Because 
most criminal defendants are also "individuals," the 
State's apparent view would essentially collapse the 
"enterprise" and "pattern of unlawful activity" 
elements into one and would extend the scope of 
antiracketeermg laws to virtually all substantive 
criminal offenses Courts have universally rejected 
such efforts "to dress a garden-variety fraud and 
deceit case in RICO clothing " Condict v Condict, 
826 F 2d 923, 929 (10th Cir 1987) |FN13] 
FN 12 "The RICO person m a civil or criminal 
RICO action is the defendant " Crowe v Henry, 
43 F 3d 198, 204 (5th Cir 1995) A "person" 
under UPUAA is "any individual or entity capable 
of holding a legal or beneficial interest m 
property[]" Utah Code Ann § 76-10- 1602(3) 
(1999) Accord 18 U S C A § 1961(3) (West 
2000) (A " 'person' includes any individual or 
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial 
interest m property [ ]") 
FN13 In State v McGrath, 749 P 2d 631 (Utah 
1988), the Utah Supreme Court explained "To 
avoid running afoul of constitutional prohibitions 
against double jeopardy, the federal courts have 
held under the federal [RICO] Act that the 
government must prove at least one element 
beyond the pattern of racketeering activity That 
additional element is the existence of an 
'enterprise ' " Id at 636 
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court stated 
That a wholly criminal enterprise comes within the 
ambit of the statute does not mean that a "pattern 
of racketeering activity" is an "enterprise " In 
order to secure a conviction under RICO, the 
Government must prove both the existence of an 
"enterprise" and the connected "pattern of 
racketeering activity " While the proof used to 
establish these separate elements may in particular 
cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily 
establish the other The "enterprise" is not the 
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"pattern of racketeering activity", it is an entity 
separate and apart from the pattern of activity in 
which it engages The existence of an enterprise at 
all times remains a separate element which must be 
proved by the Government 
United States v Turkette, 452 U S 576, 583, 101 
SCt 2524, 2528-29, 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981) 
(emphasis added) See also Ouaknine v 
MacFarlane, 897 F 2d 75, 82 (2d Cir 1990) 
("Under the plain language of [RICO] the 
violation is not established by mere participation m 
predicate acts of racketeering "), State v 
Thompson, 751 P 2d 805, 816 (Utah Ct App 1988) 
( [UPUAA] does not simply punish multiple 
violations of statutes prohibiting the acts 
enumerated in section 76-10-1602(1) Instead, 
[UPUAA] punishes participation in a pattern of 
racketeering activity bearing the required 
relationship to an enterprise ") 
**29 The stipulation submitted in this case suffers 
from an additional fatal defect in that it fails to 
include any facts suggesting Bradshaw used the 
proceeds from his fraudulent activity to invest or 
gain an interest in an enterprise as required by 
section 76-10-1603(1) Instead, the stipulation states 
that Bradshaw used the money to pay his "personal 
bills " [FN 14] The trial court nevertheless deemed 
the stipulation sufficient in this respect, finding that, 
as a matter of law, using the proceeds from a pattern 
of unlawful activity to pay one's personal bills 
"qualifies as] racketeering " [FN 15] We disagree 
FN 14 Recognizing that the stipulation is deficient 
m this respect, the State urges us on appeal to 
"assume that some of [Bradshaw's personal] bills 
covered defendant s vehicle expenses m traveling 
and telephone expenses m contacting the various 
victims " We decline to make this assumption 
See generally Rivera v State Farm Mut Auto Ins 
Co , 2000 UT 36,11 11, 1 P 3d 539 ("A stipulation 
may not be disregarded or set aside at will ' ") 
(citation omitted), supra note 3 
FN 15 The dialogue that took place between 
Bradshaw s counsel and the trial court at the 
hearing on Bradshaw's motion to quash the 
bindover is illustrative 
DEFENSE COUNSEL It's my contention that in 
order to meet the elements of [UPUAA], [the State 
has] to show [the proceeds were] invested 
somehow towards furthering the scheme, so him 
using the proceeds for himself, to buy himself 
some Star[b]ucks Coffee or take himself to the 
movie or put gas in his car for whatever purpose, 
wouldn't meet that If he uses the proceeds to 
print out business cards to help further his 
communication fraud scheme, arguably, that 
would I don't believe the State has any evidence 
that these were used for anything other than him 
and his just normal living expenses 
THE COURT Well, and that s what I'm-I'm 
finding, that I respectfully disagree, that using the 
proceeds for himself, if you will, or not towards 
furthering the scheme does qualify under that 
element m the racketeering 
*370 **30 The language of UPUAA is clear that 
the defendant must "use or invest" the proceeds 
from the unlawful activity in the proscribed manner, 
namely the "acquisition," "establishment," or 
"operation of" an "enterprise " Utah Code Arm § 
76-10-1603(1) See Bell, 770 P 2d at 103 n 2 
("[UPUAA] makes it a crime to use the profits of 
racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an 
interest in an enterprise ") Accord Hutchings, 950 
P 2d at 430 (" 'A [RICO] violation occurs not when 
the defendant engages m the predicate acts, but only 
when he uses or invests the proceeds of that activity 
in an enterprise ' ") (citation omitted) 
[14][15] **31 Similarly, in Grider v Texas Oil & 
Gas Corp , 868 F 2d 1147 (10th Cir ), cert denied, 
493 U S 820, 110 S Ct 76, 107 L Ed 2d 43 (1989) 
, the court stated "Significantly, the [RICO] statute 
does not state that it is unlawful to receive 
racketeering income, rather, as the language 
underscores, the statute prohibits a person who has 
received such income from using or investing it in 
the proscribed manner " Id at 1149 (emphasis m 
original) Thus, in federal RICO prosecutions, 
showing that the defendant used the fraudulently 
obtained income in the proscribed manner is part of 
the government's prima facie case See Vicom, Inc 
v Harbndge Merch Servs , Inc , 20 F 3d 771, 778 
(7th Cir 1994) ("A [RICO] violation requires 'the 
receipt of income from a pattern of racketeering 
activity, and the use of that income m the operation 
of an enterprise ' ") (citation omitted), United 
States v Cauble, 706 F 2d 1322, 1331 (5th 
Cir 1983) ("The government establishes a [RICO] 
violation by proving the existence of an enterprise, 
the defendant's derivation of mcome from a pattern 
of racketeering activity, and the use of any part of 
that income in acquiring an interest in or operatmg 
the enterprise "), cert denied, 465 U S 1005, 104 
S Ct 996, 79 L Ed 2d 229 (1984), Allen v New 
World Coffee, Inc , No 00 Civ 2610(AGS), 2002 
WL 432685, *4, 2002 U S Dist LEXIS 4624, at 
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**8 (S D N Y 2002) ("The 'essence of a [RICO] 
violation is not commission of predicate acts but 
investment of racketeering income ' ") (quoting 
Discon, Inc v NYNEX Corp , 93 F 3d 1055, 1063 
(2d Cir 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 525 U S 
128, 119 SCt 493, 142 L Ed 2d 510 (1998)), 
[FN 16] Barker v E F. Hutton & Co., No 
C-89-1840 EFL, 1990 WL 257283, *2, 1990 U S 
Dist LEXIS 19039, at *6 (N D Cal July 6, 1990) 
(holdmg that "section 1962(a) is not violated 
where the RICO defendant merely profits from a 
pattern of racketeering activity but does not 
otherwise invest this money in a RICO enterprise") 
FN 16 The federal RICO statute "creates a civil 
cause of action under section 1964(c) against those 
injured by violations of section 1962(a)- (d) " 
Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc v JI Case Co , 855 
F2d 241, 242 n 1 (5th Cir 1988), cert denied, 
489 U S 1079, 109 S Ct 1531, 103 L Ed 2d 836 
(1989) Since " 'Congress intended civil RICO 
plaintiffs to prove the same elements which the 
Government must prove in a criminal case,' " 
Slattery v Costello, 586 F Supp 162, 164 
(D D C 1983) (citation omitted), civil RICO cases 
are illustrative of the required elements for a prima 
facie case of racketeering 
**32 Like its RICO cousin, UPUAA is a fairly 
intricate criminal statute, and the stipulation in this 
case, focused as it was on facts pertinent to other 
crimes, I e , to "a garden-variety fraud and deceit 
case," Condict v Condict, 826 F 2d 923, 929 (10th 
Cir 1987), is wholly insufficient to demonstrate 
probable cause to support a bmdover on the 
racketeering charge See Dempsey v Sanders, 132 
F Supp 2d 222, 226 (S D N Y 2001) (" '[Because 
the RICO statute] is an unusually potent weapon-the 
litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device 
courts must always be on the lookout for the 
putative RICO case that is really nothing more than 
an ordinary fraud case clothed m the Emperor's 
trendy garb ' ") (quoting Schmidt v Fleet Bank, 16 
F Supp 2d 340, 346 (S D N Y 1998)), State v 
Huynh, 519 N W 2d 191, 195 (Minn 1994) ( 
"Clearly, our statute is not limited to drug 'kingpins' 
or major crime syndicates, but neither *371 do we 
think our Act is intended to make a racketeer out of 
every criminal offender ") 
CONCLUSION 
**33 Pursuant to the language and policy 
underlying Utah's Communications Fraud statute, 
the State should not be permitted to attribute the 
aggregated amount of $5,400 to each individual 
victim of each scheme perpetrated by Bradshaw m 
the course of his fraudulent activity Additionally, 
the State failed to demonstrate probable cause that 
Bradshaw was engaged in an "enterprise" as 
required by subsections (1) and (2) of section 
76-10-1603 Accordmgly, the trial court's order is 
reversed and the case remanded with instructions to 
grant Bradshaw's motion to reduce the degree of the 
charged offenses on the communications fraud 
counts and to quash the racketeering charge against 
him, and for such other proceedings as may now be 
appropriate 
**34 I CONCUR JUDITH M BILLINGS, 
Presidmg Judge 
THORNE, Judge (dissenting) 
**35 I respectfully dissent First, although I agree 
that the racketeermg charge presents a close 
question, I disagree with the majority's conclusion 
In short, the State's evidence-when all reasonable 
mferences are drawn in the State's favor—establishes 
sufficient probable cause to suppoit the charge at 
this stage of the proceeding Similarly, when the 
communications fraud charges are analyzed with the 
proper deference, and in light of the statute's plain 
language, this court should conclude that the trial 
court acted properly in denying Bradshaw's motion 
to quash 
I Racketeermg 
**36 The majority opinion decides that the trial 
court erred m denying Bradshaw's motion to quash 
the racketeermg charge However, that decision 
grants neither the trial court, nor the State, the 
deference to which it is entitled in this settmg 
[FN1] 
FN1 In 2001, the Utah Supreme Court clarified 
the quantum of evidence necessary to bind a 
defendant over on charges See State v Clark, 
2001 UT 9, fl 10-16, 20 P 3d 300 After 
discussing the existing precedent, which was the 
source of a great deal of confusion, the court 
formulated the following standard as the standard 
applicable to all bmdover challenges 
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must 
show ' probable cause at a preliminary hearing by 
presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that 
the 'crime charged has been committed and that the 
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defendant has committed it ' " At this stage of the 
proceeding, "the evidence required [to show 
probable cause] is relatively low because the 
assumption is that the prosecution's case will only 
get stronger as the investigation continues " 
Accordingly, "[w]hen faced with conflicting 
evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the 
evidence but must leave those tasks 'to the fact 
finder at trial ' " Instead, "[t]he magistrate must 
view all evidence m the light most favorable to the 
prosecution and must draw all reasonable 
inferences m favor of the prosecution " 
Id at ^ 10 (alterations m original) (citations 
omitted) 
The supreme court further stated that there exists 
"no principled basis to maintain a distinction 
between the arrest warrant probable cause standard 
and the preliminary hearing probable cause 
standard " Id at \ 16 Consequently, if the State 
presents the court with sufficient information to 
issue an arrest warrant, a defendant's motion to 
quash a bmdover should not be granted 
In application, the facts of Clark gave "rise to two 
alternate [and reasonable] inferences ' Id 3i\ 20 
However, the court established earlier in its 
opinion that our duty is to view " 'all evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution' " and 
draw " 'all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
prosecution ' " Id at ^ 10 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added) Thus, although the court 
conceded that the evidence could be interpreted to 
suggest that the defendants were nothing more than 
innocent victims, it concluded that the trial court 
erred m quashing the charges 
In State v Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, 44 P 3d 730, 
and State v Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, 26 P 3d 223, 
the court was again required to apply the standard 
that it had adopted in Clark In Hawatmeh, the 
trial court had refused to bind the defendants over 
on aggravated kidnaping charges See Hawatmeh, 
2001 UT 51 at \ 2, 26 P 3d 223 On appeal, the 
supreme court reiterated the bmdover standard 
See id at 1ffl 14-15 The court then, after setting 
forth both the State's and the defendants' theories, 
stated "[although defendants' characterizations of 
the facts may be plausibly inferred from the 
evidence, there are clearly factual issues that must 
be resolved at trial, and the facts do not negate the 
reasonable inferences presented by the State " Id 
at \ 20 The court therefore reversed the trial 
court's decision and reinstated the aggravated 
kidnaping charges See id at \ 21 
In Schroyer, the defendant challenged the trial 
court's denial of his motion to quash intentional 
homicide charges Schroyer, 2002 UT 26 at U f 
9-12, 44 P 3d 730 On appeal, the supreme court 
reaffirmed its position that ' [t]he evidence must be 
viewed 'in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution' with all inferences resolved in the 
prosecution's favor " Id at \ 10 More 
importantly, the court stated "[t]he defendant 
should be bound over for trial 'unless the evidence 
is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable 
inference to prove some issue which supports the 
prosecution's claim[ ]' " Id (alterations omitted) 
(quoting State v Talbot, 972 P 2d 435, 437 (Utah 
1998)) Furthermore, the court clarified the 
State's burden at the bmdover stage, stating "[a]t 
this stage of the proceedings, all that the State must 
do is establish that its theory of [the crime charged] 
is reasonable " Zc? at K 12 Consequently, after 
examining the evidence, the court affirmed the trial 
court's decision to deny the defendant's motion 
See id 
In the instant case, the bmdover standard applied 
by the majority opinion is insufficient Under 
Clark and its progeny, we are required to draw all 
reasonable evidentiary inferences in the state's 
favor The majority opinion, instead, draws its 
inferences in Bradshaw's favor, with predictable 
results Although I agree that this case's facts, as 
presented at the bmdover hearing, are insufficient 
to support a conviction of Bradshaw, they are 
similar m sufficiency to the evidence presented in 
Schroyer, Hawatmeh, and Clark As such, the 
State presented sufficient evidence to bind 
Bradshaw over on the racketeering charge 
*372 **37 Using a truncated standard of review, 
the majority opinion concludes that the State failed 
to establish either the existence of, or Bradshaw's 
investment in, an enterprise [FN2] The majority 
opinion's approach fails to draw all of the 
reasonable inferences from the evidence in the 
State's favor [FN3] However, before the evidence 
and mferences can be properly examined, I concede 
that we must identify what is meant by "enterprise" 
and determine what evidence satisfies the investment 
requirement Accordingly, I follow the majority 
opinion's lead and "look to federal case law for 
guidance on th[is] issuef ] " Buzas Baseball, Inc v 
Salt Lake Trappers, Inc , 925 P 2d 941, 947 n 5 
(Utah 1996) 
FN2 The majority opinion refers to a number of 
civil RICO cases to support its analysis I take no 
issue with its reference to civil cases in this 
context, nor do I disagree with its assertion that the 
State is required to prove that the defendant was 
involved in an enterprise and that funds derived 
from his racketeering activities enabled the 
defendant to invest resources in the enterprise 
I would like, however, to highlight that one 
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material difference exists between criminally 
prosecuting racketeering charges, based on 
violations of 18 U S C A § 1962(a), and eligibility 
to prosecute civilly under the same subsection To 
prosecute under section 1962(a), the government 
must prove 'the existence of an enterprise, the 
defendant s derivation of income from a pattern of 
racketeering activity, and the use of any part of 
that income m acquiring an interest in or operating 
the enterprise " United States v Cauble, 706 F 2d 
1322, 1331 (5th Cir 1983) However, when the 
issue is the civil application of section 1962(a), 
even if a plaintiff can show each of the elements 
required for a criminal conviction, they have no 
standing to sue unless they can show that they 
suffered damages from the racketeer's investment 
in the enterprise See Vicom, Inc v Harbndge 
Merch Servs , Inc , 20 F 3d 771, 779 n 6 (7th 
Cir 1994) (noting that, under the majority rule, the 
plaintiff lacked " § 1962(a) standing because it 
has alleged injury only from the alleged predicate 
acts, not from the investment-use of the converted 
funds"), Grider v Texas Oil & Gas Corp , 868 
F 2d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir 1989) ( It thus appears 
from the plain language of these two provisions [(§ 
§ 1962(a) and (c))] that a plaintiff seeking civil 
damages for a violation of section 1962(a) must 
plead facts tending to show that he was injured by 
the use or investment of racketeering income 
Injury from the racketeering acts themselves is not 
sufficient because section 1962(a) does not prohibit 
those acts "), Garbade v Great Divide Mining 
and Milling Corp, 831 F 2d 212, 213 (10th 
Cir 1987) (same), Allen v New World Coffee, 
Inc, No 00 Civ 2610, 2002 WL 432685, *4, 
2002 US Dist LEXIS 4624, at **8-10 
(S D N Y Mar 19, 2002) (same), Barker v EF 
Button & Co , No C-89-1840, 1990 WL 257283, 
*3, 1990 US Dist LEXIS 19039, at *8 
(N D Cal July 6, 1990) (same) Thus, civil cases 
are not perfectly analogous 
represents a property interest and may be 
acquired But the statutory language does not 
mandate that the enterprise be a "profit-seeking" 
entity, it simply requires that the enterprise be an 
entity that was acquired through illegal *373 
activity or the money generated from illegal 
activity 
National Org for Women, Inc v Scheidler, 510 
U S 249, 259, 114 S Ct 798, 127 L Ed 2d 99 
(1994) [FN4] Additionally, courts have not 
required prosecutors to plead the facts supporting a 
racketeering indictment m detail See United States 
v Habicht, 766 F Supp 22, 26 (D Mass 1991) 
("There is simply no case law to support the 
defendants' contention that a RICO indictment must 
plead facts m extraordinary detail "), Azunte Corp 
v Amster & Co, 730 F Supp 571, 577 
(S D N Y 1990) (stating that, aside from the fraud 
itself, the elements of a RICO charge need not be 
pleaded with particularity) And, m fact, while 
"three elements are necessary to prove the existence 
of an enterpnse[,]" these elements "are not 
necessary to plead a cause of action under the RICO 
statute " Federal Ins. Co v Ayers, 741 F Supp 
1179, 1183 (ED Pa 1990) Nor is there any 
requirement that the person and the enterprise be 
separate or distinct [FN5] See Riverwoods 
Chappaqua Corp v Marine Midland Bank, N A , 
30 F 3d 339, 345 (2d Cir 1994) (statmg "there is no 
requirement under section 1962(a) (as opposed to 
section 1962(c)) that the 'person' be distinct from 
the 'enterprise' "), Banks v Wolk, 918 F 2d 418, 
421 (3d Cir 1990) (same), Official Publ'ns, Inc v 
Kable News Co , 884 F 2d 664, 668 (7th Cir 1989) 
(same), Yellow Bus Lines v Drivers, Chauffeurs & 
Helpers Local Union 639, 883 F 2d 132, 140 
(D C Cir 1989) (same) 
FN3 The decision of the majority opinion to draw 
no inference m favor of the State because the 
parties stipulated to the facts presented to the 
magistrate is without precedent Moreover, this 
approach fails take into account that, not only was 
Bradshaw not forced into accepting the stipulation, 
he voluntarily entered into it Consequently, I can 
discern no reason to penalize the State by refusing 
to draw all inferences in its favor, as required, and 
I am certain that the majority opinion errs m doing 
so 
**38 Under federal case law, a section 1962(a) 
"enterprise" 
may very well be a "profit seeking" entity that 
FN4 Although the Supreme Court uses the term 
"entity," this should not be interpreted as limiting 
the scope of what can constitute an enterprise See 
Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp v Marine Midland 
Bank, NA, 30 F 3d 339, 345 (2d Cir 1994) 
(stating "there is no requirement under section 
1962(a) (as opposed to section 1962(c)) that the 
'person' be distinct from the 'enterprise' ") 
FN5 At least one circuit has held that "there is no 
requirement under RICO that an enterprise have an 
'ascertainable structure " United States v 
Connolly, 341 F 3d 16, 27 (1st Cir 2003) (citation 
omitted) 
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**39 Consequently, for purposes of interpreting 
Utah Code section 76-10- 1603(1), there is nothing 
that requires the defendant and the enterprise to be 
distinct Nor does the statute require that a section 
76-10-1603(1) charge be pleaded with any 
particularity Instead, the statute only requires that 
the State's evidence reasonably suggest (for 
purposes of bindover) the existence of an enterprise, 
regardless of its composition 
**40 Similarly, 
[s]ection 1962(a) does not exact rigorous proof of 
the exact course of income derived from a pattern 
of racketeering activity into its ultimate "use or 
investment " The key operative terms of the 
section, as specifically charged here, are 
expansive, not restrictive ones 'use or invest," 
"any part," "income or proceeds," "directly 
or indirectly," "establishment or operation " In 
combination these broad, disjunctively-phrased 
terms negate any requirement that the tainted 
income must be specifically and directly traced in 
proof from its ongmal illegal receipt to its 
ultimately proscribed "use or investment" by the 
defendant 
United States v Vogt, 910 F 2d 1184, 1194 (4th 
Cir 1990) (citations omitted) Moreover, federal 
courts have also determined that savings realized as 
a result of racketeering activity satisfy the income 
requirement See Azurite Corp , 730 F Supp at 578 
("The Court cannot fmd that savings, which are the 
direct result of fraudulent or otherwise illegal 
activity, are not income ") 
**41 Therefore, to plead a section 76-10-1603(1) 
violation adequately, the State is not required to 
produce evidence of direct investment, nor even 
evidence directly showing the investment of money 
in an enterprise Rather, the State must merely 
produce evidence, again for the specific purpose of 
bindover, from which a reasonable mference could 
be drawn that the racketeering activity enabled the 
defendant to use the proceeds to further his interest 
in an enterprise 
**42 Here, the stipulated facts demonstrate that 
Bradshaw engaged in a pattern of unlawful activity 
from which he realized income The stipulation 
further showed that Bradshaw used the funds for his 
own purposes *374 From this information, it takes 
little effort to draw the reasonable inference that 
Bradshaw was able to save funds derived from 
legitimate activity and that he could then mvest 
those saved funds Moreover, the stipulation can 
also be reasonably interpreted to suggest that 
Bradshaw himself was the enterprise and that 
through this enterprise he was able to collect 
sensitive information concerning people's financial 
circumstances, needs, and desires, thus satisfying 
the enterprise related requirements of section 
76-10-1603(1) 
**43 Finally, the majority opinion states that 
"[cjourts have universally rejected such efforts 'to 
dress a garden-variety fraud and deceit case in 
RICO clothing ' " (Quoting Condict v Condict, 826 
F 2d 923, 929 (10th Cir 1987)) The majority 
opinion further seems to suggest that courts must 
take great care to ensure that only proper defendants 
are subject to prosecution under Utah's Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity Act (UPUAA) I declme to 
subscribe to either of these assertions 
**44 First, Bradshaw's victims would likely not 
characterize his crimes as "garden-variety," nor 
would they likely be offended by the racketeering 
charge [FN6] Furthermore, from the evidence 
before us, it is clear that Bradshaw's crimes 
required not only a great deal of forethought, 
planning, and execution on his part, but that in 
selecting his victims he had access to a great deal of 
sensitive financial mformation that should not have 
been available to him Moreover, contrary to the 
majority opinion's desire to describe this and similar 
situations as "garden-variety fraud and deceit," 
communications fraud and racketeering may well 
occur hand-m-glove See, e g , Russello v United 
States, 464 U S 16, 17-18, 104 S Ct 296, 78 
L Ed 2d 17 (1983) (reviewmg the defendant's 
convictions for mail fraud and racketeermg), United 
States v Turkette, 452 U S 576, 578-81, 101 S Ct 
2524, 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981) (reviewing convictions 
of racketeering, mail fraud, and "various [other] 
substantive criminal acts") 
FN6 The case cited by the majority opinion for 
this proposition is inapplicable to this case See 
Condict v Condict, 826 F 2d 923 (10th Cir 1987) 
Condict focused on a civil dispute that arose 
between family members over ownership interests 
in a ranch See id at 924-25 On appeal, 
following the trial court s dismissal of the claim, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court s decision However, although the court 
used the phrase garden variety fraud and deceit," 
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the court found that the action had been properly 
dismissed because, the plaintiffs failed to show 
both "a pattern of racketeering activities" and the 
"continuity requirement' required to satisfy section 
1962(c) Id at 929 (quotations and citation 
omitted) In this case, Bradshaw concedes that he 
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, and 
the continuity requirement of section 1962(c) has 
no application Thus, Condict is not helpful 
**45 In light of Bradshaw's admissions, the 
majority opinion's analysis is problematic 
Although it is possible that a jury might have 
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict Bradshaw of "racketeering," there is nothing 
in the record that suggests his crimes amounted to 
nothing more than "garden-variety" fraud Rather, 
Bradshaw's crimes evince the image of a profligate 
con-man, bent on victimizing a large number of 
susceptible people through the application of a 
common method, and then using the proceeds to 
finance his farther endeavors 
**46 Second, the majority opinion's concern for 
potential misuse of racketeermg charges, while 
understandable, finds little support in either the 
Umted States Supreme Court, or in the federal 
courts of appeal As succinctly stated by the 
Supreme Court " 'The occasion for Congress' 
action was the perceived need to combat organized 
crime But Congress for cogent reasons chose to 
enact a more general statute, one which, although it 
had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in 
application to organized crime ' " National Org for 
Women, Inc v Scheidler, 510 U S 249, 260, 114 
S Ct 798, 127 L Ed 2d 99 (1994) (citation omitted) 
" ' "The fact that RICO has been applied in 
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress 
demonstrates breadth " ' " Id at 262, 114 S Ct 798 
(citations omitted) Or, as the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated, " 'Congress has instructed us to 
construe RICO "liberally to effectuate its 
remedial purposes " ' " United States v Connolly, 
341 F 3d 16, 28 (1st Cir 2003) (citations omitted), 
see also United States v Cauble, 706 F 2d 1322, 
1330 (5th Cir 1983) ("RICO's application and 
effectiveness have been enhanced by the judicial 
*375 consensus that it may be used even though no 
organized crime activity is charged[]") 
Consequently, rather than policing the State's 
decision to charge a defendant with racketeering to 
avoid its possible thermonuclear effects, our role is 
more properly limited to determining solely whether 
the State met its burden, I e , is the information and 
evidence sufficient to support bindover? 
**47 Here, Bradshaw concedes that he engaged m 
a pattern of unlawful activity He also admits to 
having realized proceeds from the pattern Thus, 
the only question left is whether the State presented 
sufficient mformation to show, foi the purpose of 
bmdover, an enterprise and the use of unlawful 
proceeds to the benefit of the enterprise [FN7] 
FN7 In concluding that the State failed to show 
that there was probable cause to believe that 
Bradshaw was involved m an enterprise, the 
majority opinion relies on State v Bell, 770 P 2d 
100 (Utah 1988) Although the majority opinion 
concedes that Bell reached the supreme court m a 
different procedural posture, its opinion fails to 
clearly identify the key differences 
In Bell, the defendant was convicted of 
racketeermg by a jury See id at 101 He 
appealed and his conviction was reversed See id 
The supreme court found that the state had failed to 
provide the defendant with a court ordered bill of 
particulars See id at 105 Consequently, the 
supreme court concluded that the defendant s 
defense efforts had been irreparably prejudiced by 
the state's inaction See id at 106 ("The specific 
question, then, is whether the State's failure to 
notify [the defendant] of these three factual bases 
for the allegations of [an] enterprise so impeded his 
ability to prepare a defense to those allegations as 
to require reversal under rule 30" of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure ) Specifically, the 
court found that the defendant was not provided 
with the required notice that would have enabled 
him to adequately prepare his defense See id at 
107 
Significantly, Bell nowhere discussed the subject of 
probable cause, nor did the supreme court suggest 
that the indictment filed against the defendant was 
not supported by probable cause Moreover, at no 
point in Bell does the court even intimate that the 
defendant had been bound over improperly 
Rather, the court focused its attention on the state s 
"failure to provide an adequate bill of particulars" 
and concluded that said failure "unfairly 
prejudiced the defendant's] ability to prepare and 
present a defense" at trial Id at 107 
Consequently, the court in Bell was focused on the 
fairness of the defendant's trial, and although the 
enterprise issue was discussed, the discussion 
focused solely on the proof that is necessary to 
convict under our racketeering statute See id at 
103 n 2 Accordingly, I do not believe that Bell 
assists in resolving the instant case, nor does Bell 
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offer any material assistance to the analysis of the 
issue before this court. Had Bradshaw desired, he 
could have relied upon Bell to demand a bill of 
particulars, and the State would have been required 
to provide those particulars. 
**48 The State presented evidence that Bradshaw 
had engaged in a pattern of unlawful activities 
through which he defrauded a number of people, 
over a wide geographic range, of an aggregate 
amount over $5,000. The State's evidence is subject 
to a reasonable inference that Bradshaw had access 
to, or was provided with, sensitive information 
concerning the victims' finances, as well as their 
perceived or actual need for money. The evidence 
can also be reasonably interpreted to support an 
inference that Bradshaw used the proceeds to fund 
his existence, his lifestyle, and his ongoing efforts to 
defraud additional victims. This evidence, and all 
reasonable inferences that can be made from it, 
demonstrate that probable cause existed to believe 
that Bradshaw's activities amounted to racketeering. 
[FN8] See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine 
Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 345 (2d 
Cir.1994) (stating "there is no requirement under 
section 1962(a) (as opposed to section 1962(c)) that 
the 'person' be distinct from the 'enterprise' "); 
Official Publ'ns., Inc. v. Kable News Co., 884 F.2d 
664, 668 (2d Cir.1989) ("Thus, under [section] 
1962(a), it may be possible for a defendant to also 
be the enterprise."); accord American Mfrs. Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Townson, 912 F.Supp. 291, 295 
(E.D.Tenn.1995) (finding that a marriage can satisfy 
the enterprise requirement for section 1962(c) 
claims). Consequently, the trial court properly 
denied Bradshaw's motion to quash the bindover 
order on the racketeering *376 charge. [FN9] 
FN8. While not necessary, it is also clear that the 
facts and reasonable inferences supporting 
Bradshaw's pattern of unlawful conduct are distinct 
from the facts and inferences that would tend to 
show that he, himself, was the enterprise and that 
he somehow used his ill-gotten gains to the benefit 
of the enterprise. But see State v. Hatchings, 950 
P.2d 425, 432 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) (noting "the 
Utah Supreme Court has implicitly ruled that the 
same set of facts used to prove the pattern of 
unlawful activity can be used to prove the existence 
of an enterprise"). 
FN9. Although the evidence presented at the 
bindover hearing is sufficient to survive a motion 
to quash, I agree that absent more, the evidence is 
probably insufficient to convict Bradshaw of 
racketeering. However, based upon the supreme 
court's instruction that we assume the State's case 
will only get stronger, see State v. Clark, 2001 UT 
9,H 10> 20 P.3d 300, the trial court properly denied 
Bradshaw's motion to quash. 
II. Communications Fraud 
**49 I disagree with the majority opinion's 
decision to focus its analysis on the word "scheme" 
in its interpretation and application of the 
communications fraud statute. I am also concerned 
with the problematic determination that the word 
"another," as used in the statute, should be 
interpreted solely in the singular. Accordingly, I 
disagree with the majority opinion's reliance upon 
these terms to conclude that the statute is ambiguous 
and that, under the rule of lenity, the State is 
precluded from charging Bradshaw as it did. 
Finally, I disagree with the majority opinion's foray 
into policy discussion, which is, in this instance, an 
inappropriate invasion of the legislature's province. 
**50 The majority opinion parses the language of 
section 76-10-1801 to determine that the statute's 
operative and controlling term is "scheme." 
However, in doing so, the majority opinion ignores 
both the plain language of the statute and our duty to 
" 'avoid interpretations that will render portions of a 
statute superfluous or inoperative.' " State v. 
Martinez, 2002 UT 80, U 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (quoting 
Hall v. Department ofCorr., 2001 UT 34, K 15, 24 
P.3d 958). Section 76-10-1801, in relevant part, 
reads: 
Any person who has devised any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from 
another money, property, or anything of value by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, 
and who communicates directly or indirectly with 
any person by any means for the purpose of 
executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is 
guilty[ of communications fraud.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1999) (emphasis 
added). 
**51 It is clear from the statutory plain language 
that the legislature chose the phrase "scheme or 
artifice to defraud" in articulating the conduct 
prohibited by the statute. The majority opinion, 
however, ignores the legislature's clear indication of 
its intent. Consequently, the interpretation fails to 
give effect to the statute's unambiguous language, 
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and instead adopts an interpretation that renders 
"portions of the statute superfluous or inoperative,' 
" Martinez, 2002 UT 80 at H 8, 52 P 3d 1276 as 
well as a reading that " 'contradicts] its plain 
meaning ' " State v Burns, 2000 UT 56,11 25> 4 
P 3d 795 (citation omitted) 
**52 The majority opinion's approach then uses its 
interpretation of "scheme" as a springboard for its 
determination that the word "another" must be 
viewed in the singular However, beyond its 
reliance on the term "scheme," the majority opmion 
offers little substantive support for its interpretation 
of "another " This approach ignores our duty to 
interpret such words fluidly, offermg both plural and 
singular application, unless such an interpretation 
would be "inconsistent with the manifest intent of 
the Legislature or repugnant to the context of the 
statute " Utah Code Ann § 68-3-12(1) (2000) 
(emphasis added) Because section 76-10 1801 
contams no such limiting language, we must 
presume that the legislature intended "another" to 
refer to one or more people Thus, the plain 
language of section 76-10-1603 does not support the 
majority opinion's readmg 
**53 The meamng of section 76-10-1603 is clear 
and no ambiguity exists Without ambiguity, the 
majority opmion's lemty discussion is unnecessary 
and inapplicable See National Org for Women, 
Inc v Scheidler, 510 U S 249, 262, 114 S Ct 
798, 127 L Ed 2d 99 (1994) (statmg "the rule of 
lenity applies only when an ambiguity is present, ' 
"it is not used to beget one The rule comes into 
operation at the end of the process of construing 
what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning 
as an overriding consideration of being lenient to 
wrongdoers " ' " (citations omitted) (ellipsis in 
original)) Similarly, the majority opinion's foray 
mto policy *377 is equally inadvisable As noted by 
our supreme court 
"We may not require the legislature to select the 
least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty 
selected is not cruelly inhumane or 
disproportionate to the crime involved And a 
heavy burden rests on those who would attack the 
judgment of the representatives of the people 
'[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, 
are constituted to respond to the will and 
consequently the moral values of the people ' " 
State v Mace, 921 P 2d 1372, 1377 (Utah 1996) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted), see also 
State v Herrera, 895 P 2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995) 
(notmg that policy discussions are 'better 
accomplished in the legislature than m the courts"), 
Sullivan v Scoular Grain Co , 853 P 2d 877, 883 
(Utah 1993) (stating that in the absence of 
ambiguity, courts are not "free to assess the wisdom 
of a statutory scheme" (quotations and citation 
omitted)) [FN 10] 
FN10 This case, regardless of the outcome, 
involves nothing more than standard statutory 
interpretation See State v Hardy, 2002 UT App 
244, \ 10, 54 P 3d 645 (stating [w]hen language 
is clear and unambiguous, it mu>t be held to mean 
what it expresses, and no room is left for 
construction* ' (citation omitted)) The language 
of the communications fraud statute is not 
ambiguous In fact, because both the majority 
opinion and the dissent ultimately rest their 
analyses on whether Bradshaw s conduct followed 
a common method or technique, it would seem that 
we agree on the meaning of Utah Code section 
76-10 1603 Our disagreement rests instead m the 
application of the statute and not m its meaning 
Thus, the majority opinion s policy discussion 
strays into an area of construction not properly 
before this court See State v Herrera, 895 P 2d 
359, 362 (Utah 1995) (stating ' [e]ven if a court 
finds certain legislation unreasonable or unwise, 
that alone does not mean it has authority to 
invalidate it') 
**54 Accordmgly, we are called upon to determine 
whether the State's decision to charge Bradshaw 
with multiple felony counts of communications fraud 
was proper under the plain language of the statute 
Section 76-10-1801 reads, m relevant part 
Any person who has devised any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any 
person by any means for the purpose of executmg 
or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtamed or sought to be 
obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than 
$1,000, a second degree felony when the value 
of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000, 
The determination of the degree of any offense 
shall be measured by the total value of all 
property, money, or things obtamed or sought to 
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be obtained by the scheme or artifice.... 
Each separate communication made for the 
purpose of executing or concealing a scheme or 
artifice ... is a separate act and offense of 
communications fraud. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999). The 
statute's plain language suggests that the statute's 
scope is defined by the meaning and application of 
the phrase "scheme or artifice to defraud." 
**55 "[S]cheme or artifice to defraud" is widely 
defined to mean "the overall design to defraud one 
or many by means of a common plan or technique." 
United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1566 (10th 
Cir.1995) (emphasis added); see also United States 
v. Rogers, 321 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir.2003). In 
Massey, the defendants were convicted of, inter alia, 
eight counts of mail fraud. See Massey, 48 F.3d at 
1564. On appeal, the defendants argued that 
application and meaning of the phrase " 'scheme or 
artifice to defraud' is limited to each individual 
defrauded client." Id. at 1566 (citation omitted). 
The court, in response, stated that not only was the 
defendants' argument spurious and unsupported, but 
that " 'scheme to defraud' has a wider meaning than 
an individual act of fraud." Id. It is better defined as 
"the overall design to defraud one or many by 
means of a common plan or technique." Id. 
(emphases added); see also United States v. 
Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 78-81, 371 U.S. 75, *378 9 
L.Ed.2d 136(1962) (holding that activities in support 
of fraudulent activity, but not directly fraudulent in 
and of themselves, can also be considered violative 
of the federal mail fraud statute). Thus, because the 
meaning of the phrase "scheme or artifice to 
defraud" has a clear historical usage, we must 
presume that the legislature was aware of its 
meaning when it chose to use the phrase in 
criminalizing communications fraud. Consequently, 
we must also presume that the legislature intended 
the statute to be applied to any "common plan or 
technique" used by a defendant to "defraud one or 
many [people or entities.]" Massey, 48 F.3d at 
1566. [FN11] 
FN11. This outcome is further supported by 
reference to the commonly accepted definition of 
the words "to defraud." As stated by the United 
States Supreme Court, "the words 'to defraud' 
commonly refer 'to wronging one in his property 
rights by dishonest methods or schemes,' and 
'usually signify the deprivation of something of 
value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.' " 
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358, 107 
S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987) (quoting 
Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 
188, 44 S.Ct. 511, 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924)). 
**56 Here, Bradshaw stipulated to the facts 
underlying the charged conduct. That conduct 
clearly suggests that all of Bradshaw's efforts 
involved one common plan or technique. Simply 
put, Bradshaw somehow gained access to several 
people's sensitive financial information. From this 
information, Bradshaw chose his victims. He chose 
them because they desperately wanted or needed 
money to refinance their residences. Bradshaw then 
approached each victim and told each a similar or 
nearly identical story. He told each that he owned, 
solely or in part, a mortgage company and that he 
wanted to help them acquire their desired 
refinancing. He then told them that he needed a 
certain amount of money up front, to perform a 
variety of finance related tasks, before the victims 
could obtain their desired refinancing. Each of the 
eleven named victims gave Bradshaw the requested 
amount, never more than $600.00, after which 
Bradshaw disappeared from their lives, never 
performing even one of the promised services. 
[FN 12] Because Bradshaw used the same method or 
technique to defraud all of the victims, his conduct 
amounted to one "scheme or artifice to defraud." 
Consequently, the only task remaining to this court 
should be ensuring that the statute was properly 
applied to Bradshaw. 
FN 12. The majority opinion suggests that these 
facts do not equate to a single scheme or artifice to 
defraud, because the "[t]he victims were deceived 
at different times, in different places, by different 
stories, and through different methods." I am 
puzzled by the majority opinion's conclusion that 
Bradshaw approached the victims "through 
different methods" when it is clear from the 
evidence the he used one method with just a few 
minor variations. Moreover, the majority 
opinion's approach seems to be contrary to both 
United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 76-77, 83 
S.Ct. 173, 9 L.Ed.2d 136 (1962), where "[t]he 
individual defendants were officers, directors, and 
employees of a large, nationwide corporation 
[who] purported to be able to help businessmen 
obtain loans or sell out their businesses," and 
United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560 (10th 
Cir.1995), where the defendant operated an illegal 
pyramid lending scheme, which affected multiple 
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victims. 
**57 Under section 76-10-1801(2), the severity of 
the charges levied against Bradshaw must be 
"measured by the total value of all ... money ... 
obtained ... by the scheme or artifice described in 
Subsection (1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(2). 
Having concluded that Bradshaw engaged in a single 
"scheme or artifice to defraud," nothing remains 
other than simple arithmetic. From the stipulated 
facts, Bradshaw's "scheme or artifice to defraud" 
yielded him over $5,000.00. Accordingly, under 
the statute's plain language, each communication 
that Bradshaw made in furtherance of his "scheme 
or artifice to defraud" could be charged as a felony 
in the second degree, because the statute criminalize 
the communication itself, not the successful 
completion of the involved fraudulent scheme. See 
id. § 76-10-1801(l)(d), (2), (5). 
**58 Finally, under section 76-10-1801(5), "[e]ach 
separate communication [Bradshaw] made for the 
purpose of executing or concealing a scheme or 
artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud." Id. § 
76-10-1801(5). Here, Bradshaw stipulated that he 
had made or attempted at least eleven separate 
communications in furtherance of his "scheme or 
artifice to defraud." Consequently, under *379 the 
plain language of sections 76-10-1801(1) and 
76-10-1801(5), Bradshaw committed eleven separate 
violations. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) 
("Any person who has devised any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another ... who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the 
scheme or artifice is guilty" of violating the 
statute.). [FN 13] 
FN13. The majority opinion voices concern about 
the possibility that Bradshaw faced a possible 
165-year sentence if convicted of each count and if 
the trial court sentenced him to serve each term 
consecutively. However, pursuant to Utah Code 
section 76-3-401 (6)(a) (2003), Bradshaw faced a 
maximum of 30-years incarceration if he were 
convicted of all charges and sentenced to serve 
each term consecutively. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-401 (limiting the amount of time that a 
convicted person will serve under Utah's 
sentencing laws). Moreover, although the majority 
opinion suggest that the sentence Bradshaw 
possibly faced "is repugnant to notions of 
traditional" justice, I would suggest that 
Bradshaw's victims, some of whom may have 
faced financial ruin-and the possible loss of their 
businesses and homes-due to his activities, would 
believe a sentence of 165 years to be reasonable. 
**59 By its plain language, the legislature has 
decided to punish each act of communication in 
furtherance of a "scheme or artifice to defraud," and 
determined that each such act is to be punished 
based on the aggregate amount reaped through the 
scheme. Therefore, the State's decision to charge 
Bradshaw with eleven second degree felony 
communications fraud charges was proper, and the 
trial court correctly refused to reduce either the 
number or the degree of the charges. 
V. CONCLUSION 
**60 I disagree with the majority opinion's 
analyses, its lack of deference to legislative intent, 
and its ultimate conclusions. I believe that the trial 
court properly denied Bradshaw's motion to quash 
the racketeering charge. Under our bindover 
standard, articulated in State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,H 
10- 16, 20 P.3d 300, the State's evidence 
established sufficient probable cause to believe that 
Bradshaw violated the statute. 
**61 I am further convinced that the trial court 
correctly denied Bradshaw's motion to reduce either 
the degree or the number of communications fraud 
charges. Bradshaw used one common plan or 
method to defraud his victims; 1hus, his entire 
crime spree utilized one "scheme or artifice to 
defraud," subjecting him to the increased number 
and level of charges. Consequently, I would 
conclude that both the number of charges and the 
charging level were appropriate for the conduct, and 
I would therefore affirm the decision of the trial 
court. 
99 P.3d 359, 508 Utah Adv. Rep 12, 2004 UT 
App 298 
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§ 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 8 0 1 . Communications fraud—Elements—Penalties 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or 
to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and 
who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing, 
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c)>a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than 
$5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall 
be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or 
sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) 
except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described inN 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing 
of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act 
and offense of communication fraud. 
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, 
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk 
over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and 
written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made 
or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
§ 6 8 - 3 - 1 2 . Rules of construction 
(l)(a) In the construction of these statutes, the general rules listed in this 
Subsection (1) shall be observed, unless the construction would be: 
(i) inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature; or 
(ii) repugnant to the context of the statute. 
(b) The singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular. 
(c) Words used in one gender comprehend the other gender. 
(d) Words used in the present tense include the future tense. 
(e) In accordance with Title 46, Chapter 4, Part 5, Electronic Records in 
Government Agencies, words related to the medium used in the provision of 
government services may include electronic or other mediums. 
(2) In the construction of these statutes, the definitions listed in this Subsec-
tion (2) shall be observed, unless the definition would be inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the Legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute. 
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means: 
(i) all actions by a board, commission, department, officer, or other 
administrative unit of the state that determine the legal rights, duties, 
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable 
persons, including all actions to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, 
annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right or license: and 
(ii) judicial review of all such actions. 
(b) "Advisory board," "advisory commission/' and "advisory council" 
means a board, commission, or council that: 
(i) provides advice and makes recommendations to another person or 
entity who makes policy for the benefit of the general public; 
(ii) is created by and whose duties are provided by statute or by execu-
tive order; and 
(iii) performs its duties only under the supervision of another person as 
provided by statute. 
(c) "Councilman" includes a town trustee or a city commissioner, and 
"city commissioner" includes a councilman. 
(d) "County executive" means: 
(i) the county commission in the county commission or expanded county 
commission form of government established under Title 17, Chapter 52, 
Forms of County Government; ^  
(ii) the county executive in the "county executive-council." optional torm 
of government authorized by Section 17-52-504; and 
(iii) the county manager in the "council-manager" optional form of 
government authorized by Section 17-52-505, 
(e) "County legislative body" means: 
(i) the county commission in the county commission or expanded county 
commission form of government established under Title 17, Chapter 52, 
Forms of County Government; 
(ii) the county council in the county executive-council" optional form of 
government authorized by Section 17-52-504; and 
(iii) the county council in the "council-manager" optional form of gov-
ernment authorized by Section 17-52-505. 
(f) "Executor" includes administrator, and the term "administrator" in-
cludes executor) when the subject matter justifies such use. 
(g) "Guardian" includes a person who has qualified as a guardian of a 
minor or incapacitated person pursuant to testamentary'or court appoint-
ment and a person who is appointed by a court to manage the estate of a 
minor or incapacitated person. 
(h) "Highway" and "road" include public bridges and may be held equiva-
lent to the words "county way/' "county road/' "common road," and "state 
road." 
(i) "Him/' "his," and other masculine pronouns include "her/ ' "hers," 
and similar feminine pronouns unless the context clearly indicates a contrary 
intent or the subject matter relates clearly and necessarily to the male sex 
only. 
(j) "Insane person" include idiots, lunatics, distracted persons, and per-
sons of unsound mind. 
(k) "Land," "real estate," and "real property" include land, tenements, 
hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims. 
(/) "Man" or "men" when used alone or in conjunction with other 
syllables as in "workman," includes "woman" or "women" unless the 
context clearly indicates a contrary intent or the subject matter relates clearly 
and necessarily to the male sex only. 
(m) "Month" means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed, and 
the word "year," or the abbreviation "A.D." is equivalent to the expression 
"year of our Lord." 
(n) "Oath" includes "affirmation," and the word "swear" includes "af-
firm." Every oral statement under oath or affirmation is embraced in the 
term "testify," and every written one, in the term "depose." 
(o) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic and corporate, partner-
ships, associations, and companies. 
(p) "Personal property" includes every description of money, goods, chat-
tels, effects, evidences of rights in action, and all written instruments by 
which any pecuniary obligation, right, or title to property is created, ac-
knowledged, transferred, increased, defeated, discharged, or diminished, and 
every right or interest therein. 
(q) "Personal representative," "executor," and "administrator" includes 
an executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special admin-
istrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function under the 
law governing their status. 
(r) "Policy board," "policy commission," or "policy council" means a 
board, commission, or council that: 
(i) possesses a portion of the sovereign power of the state to enable it to 
make policy for the benefit of the general public; 
(ii) is created by and whose duties are provided by the constitution or by 
statute; 
(iii) performs its duties according to its own rules without supervision 
other than under the general control of another person as provided by 
statute; and 
(iv) is permanent and continuous and not temporary and occasional. 
(s) "Population" shall be as shown by the last preceding state or national 
census, unless otherwise specially provided. 
(t) "Property" includes both real and personal property. 
(u) "Review board," "review commission," or "review council" means a 
board, commission, or council that: 
(i) possesses a portion of the sovereign power of the state only to the 
extent to enable it to approve policy made for the benefit of the general 
public by another body or person; « 
(ii) is created by and whose duties are provided by statute; 
(iii) performs its duties according to its own rules without supervision 
other than under the general control of another person as provided by 
statute; and 
(iv) is permanent and continuous and not temporary and occasional. 
(v) ''Sheriff," "county attorney/' "district attorney/1 "clerk," or other 
words used to denote an executive or ministerial officer, may include any 
deputy, or other person performing the duties of Such officer, either generally 
or in special cases; and the words "county clerk" may be held to include 
"clerk of the district court." 
(w) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or sign written with the intent 
to authenticate any instrument or writing. 
(x) "State," when applied to the different parts of the United States, 
includes the District of Columbia and the territories; and the words "United 
States" may include the District and the territories., 
(y) "Town" may mean incorporated town and may include city, and the 
word "city" may mean incorporated town. 
(z) "Vessel," when used with reference to shipping, includes steamboats, 
canal boats, and every structure adapted to be navigated from place to place, 
(aa), "Will" includes codicils. 
(bb) "Writ" means an order or precept in writing, issued in the name of 
the state or of a court or judicial officer; and "process" means a writ or 
summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings, 
(cc) "Writing" includes: 
(i) printing; 
(ii) handwriting; and 
(iii) information stored in an electronic or other medium if the informa-
tion is retrievable in a perceivable format. 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 4 0 1 . Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutive-
ly with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecu-
tively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as 
provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct 
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, 
and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his 
initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if 
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed tb run concurrent-
ly with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that 
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of 
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed 
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has 
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of 
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Defendant. : Judge Michael K Burton 
For purpose of preliminary hearing only, the parties stipulate and agree that, if 
called to testify at preliminary hearing, the following people would testify as follows. 
JEFF AHLSTROM 
In April 2000, Brooks Bradshaw met with Mr Ahlstrom at 629 East 2875 North, 
Provo, Utah. Mr Ahlstrom was attempting to refinance his residence, and Mr. Bradshaw 
represented himself to be a co-owner of Classic Mortgage, and purported to have financial 
interest in numerous other mortgage companies including In-Time Funding. Mr. Bradshaw told 
Mr Ahlstrom that for a fee, $500 00, he would complete the title search, credit check and other 
necessary documentation to secure Mr. Ahlstrom's refinancing. Mr. Ahlstrom gave Mr. 
Bradshaw $500.00, and Mr. Bradshaw did not complete what he told Mr. Ahlstrom he would. 
DENNY MOORE 
On April 4, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Mr. Moore at 9049 South Kenyon 
Circle, West Jordan, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw introduced himself and told Mr. Moore he was the 
owner of Classic Mortgage in St. George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. Moore that he could 
refinance or restructure his present mortgage. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. Moore that he would have 
to pay Mr. Bradshaw $450.00 for a title search and credit report. Mr. Moore presented Mr. 
Bradshaw $450.00 in cash and requested a receipt. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he would prepare a 
receipt and get it to him. Mr. Moore would testify that no receipt has ever been given to him, and 
no credit report or title search has been completed. Mr. Moore attempted to contact Mr. 
Bradshaw, but learned that all the contact numbers Mr. Bradshaw had given him had been 
changed. 
HALBERT GRIBBLE 
On May 5, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Mr. Gribble at 820 East Scott Avenue, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself to Mr. Gribble as the owner of Classic 
Mortgage, in St. George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw informed Mr. Gribble that he was aware that Mr. 
Gribble was in the middle of a foreclosure process on his residence. Mr. Bradshaw represented to 
Mr. Gribble that for a fee of $500.00, Mr. Bradshaw would provide a title search and appraisal on 
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Mr. Gribble's property and assist him with refinancing. Mr. Gribble gave Mr. Bradshaw $500.00, 
and has not heard from Mr. Bradshaw since. 
ELIZABETH AND KEITH FITZGERALD 
On March 3, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Brett Kennedy met with Elizabeth and 
Keith Fitzgerald at 9527 South Caledona Circle, South Jordan, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented 
himself as the owner of Classic Mortgage in St. George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he could 
refinance the Fitzgeralds' residence in Mr. Bradshaw's name through a Quit Claim Deed, and in 
two years he would deed it back to the Fitzgeralds. Mr. Bradshaw indicated to Elizabeth 
Fitzgerald that he had access to plenty of money and that he could also purchase their store. Mr. 
Bradshaw stated that if he decided not to purchase the store, he knew other individuals who 
would be interested. Mr. Bradshaw presented Mrs Fitzgerald with a loan application and stated 
he would require $450.00 to pay for the credit check and appraisal. Mrs. Fitzgerald informed Mr. 
Bradshaw that she had the residence appraised in November 1999, but the appraisal was not high 
enough to refinance. Mr. Bradshaw told Mrs. Fitzgerald that that would not be a problem, he 
would get an appraisal high enough. Mrs. Fitzgerald gave Mr. Bradshaw $450.00, and Mr. 
Bradshaw has not contacted or delivered anything he represented he would accomplish. 
RICHARD BRIMLEY 
On April 15, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Richard Brimley at 5168 South 
Cottonwood Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the co-owner of 
Classic Mortgage and stated that he had brokered loans with several mortgage companies. Mr. 
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Brimley would testify that he informed Mr. Bradshaw in detail about the real estate project he was 
attempting to complete and the financing he would require. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. Brimley that 
for $500.00 he would complete an appraisal, title search and credit check. Mr. Brimley gave Mr. 
Bradshaw a check for $500.00, made out to Mr. Bradshaw, because Mr. Bradshaw stated that he 
wasn't sure which appraiser he would use. Mr. Brimley would testify that after Mr. Bradshaw 
took the check and cashed it, Mr. Bradshaw has not made contact with him; Mr. Brimley also has 
been unable to contact Mr. Bradshaw. 
MAURICE AND LOUISE OHUMUKINI 
On April 17, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Maurice and Louise Ohumukini, at 
1160 East 800 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of 
Classic Mortgage, in St. George, Utah. Mrs. Ohumukini would testify that Mr. Bradshaw told 
her that with his financial contacts and resources he would assist her in refinancing some property 
she and her husband owned. Mr. Bradshaw told her that for $500.00 he would arrange for an 
appraisal on the property, and complete the necessary title search and credit check for refinancing. 
Mrs. Ohumukini gave Mr. Bradshaw a check for $500.00 for the stated work to be performed. 
Mrs. Ohumukini has not heard from Mr. Bradshaw since April, and none of the represented work 
has been completed. 
KAREN BUSH 
On June 5, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Karen Bush by telephone. Karen 
Bush's residence at 613 Blueridge Drive, Tooele, Utah was in foreclosure. Mr. Bradshaw 
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indicated to Karen that he was interested in refinancing the residence in order to help her. On 
June 11, 2000 Mr. Bradshaw met with Karen Bush and her husband, at 613 Blueridge Drive, 
Tooele, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw told Karen that he uses his own money to refinance and that a title 
search and appraisal would be necessary to complete the refinancing. Mr. Bradshaw stated the 
cost was $600.00, which would include $400.00 for the appraisal; $100.00 for the title search, 
and his fee of $100.00. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he would accomplish the transaction by June 
29, 2000, the date of the foreclosure in the Tooele County Court. Karen Bush never heard from 
Mr. Bradshaw, and she contacted the Tooele City Police Department. Detective Shawn Gleed 
contacted Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Bradshaw told Detective Gleed he would refund the $600.00. 
Karen Bush has not had contact with Mr. Bradshaw, and no refund has been made. 
MIKE AND HOLLY CURTIS 
In June 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Mike and Holly Curtis at 6587 South 
Alfred Way, Murray, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. and Mrs. Curtis that he owned a mortgage 
company, and used a title company to facilitate all his refinancing transactions. Mr. Bradshaw 
gave the Curtises a loan application form, indicating that it would grant him permission to 
perform a credit check and title search necessary to complete the refinancing. Mr. Bradshaw told 
Mr. and Mrs. Curtis that the cost would be $500.00. Holly Curtis would testify that they gave 
Mr. Bradshaw a check for $500.00, hesitantly. After they had not heard from Mr. Bradshaw they 
attempted to contact him, with no success. Mrs. Curtis and her husband, in approximately August 
2000, saw Mr. Bradshaw at a local gas station and requested their money back. Mr. Bradshaw 
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told them he would get it to them within the next couple of days. Mrs. Curtis would testify that 
they have received no contact from Mr. Bradshaw. 
CLIFF HARRIS 
On 13, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Cliff Harris at 12109 South Samson Circle, 
Draper, Utah. Mr. Harris was having some financial difficulties and was in the process of 
refinancing his residence. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of Classic Mortgage 
and stated that for $500.00 he would arrange an appraisal, credit check and title search to 
facilitate the refinance. Mr. Bradshaw indicated that there would be no problem in getting an 
appraisal high enough to sufficiently cover the refinancing. Mr. Harris gave Mr. Bradshaw 
$500.00 to perform the agreed work. Mr. Harris has had no contact with Mr. Bradshaw since 
giving him the money. 
HOLLY ANDERSON 
On April 7, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw met with Holly Anderson at 5997 South 200 
East, Murray, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of Classic Mortgage, in St. 
George, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw stated to Holly Anderson that he had the capabilities and contacts 
to assist her with refinancing her residence. Mr. Bradshaw told Holly Anderson that for $400.00 
he would complete a credit check and title search necessary to secure her refinancing. Holly 
Anderson gave Mr. Bradshaw $400.00 for the agreed work to be accomplished and has received 
nothing since the transaction. 
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MARLON ANDERSON 
On April 14, 2000, Mr. Bradshaw contacted Marlon Anderson at 9838 South 
TeeBox Drive, South Jordan, Utah. Mr. Bradshaw represented himself as the owner of a 
mortgage company. Mr. Bradshaw stated that he could assist Mr. Anderson with refinancing his 
property for a fee of $500.00. Mr. Bradshaw told Mr. Anderson that for the $500.00 he would 
arrange an appraisal, perform a credit check and complete a title search, all necessary to arrange 
the refinancing. Mr. Anderson gave Mr. Bradshaw $500.00 to complete the agreed work. Mr. 
Anderson has never received any of the promised work and has been unable to contact Mr. 
Bradshaw. 
BRETT KENNEDY 
Mr. Kennedy would testify that he used to work with the Mr. Bradshaw and he 
witnessed some of the statements and promises made by Mr. Bradshaw to the individuals listed 
above. 
WILLIAM (BILL) THOMAS 
Mr. Thomas would testify that he used to work with Mr. Bradshaw and that he 
witnessed some of the statements and promises listed above. Mr. Thomas would also testify that 
Mr. Bradshaw told him to falsely represent himself as an appraiser to Jeff Ahlstrom. 
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JOHN HEMPHILL 
Mr. Hemphill would testify that he is the owner of In-Time Funding. Mr. Hemphill 
knew Mr. Bradshaw but the representations by Mr. Bradshaw to other individuals that the 
defendant was a part owner of In-Time Funding were false. 
TERRISON SPINKS 
Mr. Spinks is the owner of Classic Mortgage. He knew the Mr. Bradshaw but the 
representations by Mr. Bradshaw to other individuals that the Mr. Bradshaw was a part owner of 
Classic Mortgage were not true. 
JON BROWN 
Mr. Brown, Lead Investigator for the Division of Real Estate, Department of 
Commerce, would testify that Mr. Bradshaw had received a NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT before the Real Estate Appraiser Registration and Certification Board in 1998. The 
defendant Brooks Bradshaw had a pattern of inflating property values for the purpose of 
defrauding by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Defendant Brooks Bradshaw had his 
license to act as a state registered appraiser revoked in 1998. 
JEFF WRIGHT 
Mr. Wright would testify that he is an investigator with the Utah Attorney 
General's Office. Mr. Wright interviewed Mr. Bradshaw at which time Mr. Bradshaw admitted 
that he had met with the individuals listed above and in the affidavit of probable cause filed with 
this case and received money from them in return for the promises that he made to help them 
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refinance their properties. Mr. Bradshaw admitted to Investigator Wright that he used the money 
to pay his personal bills. Mr. Bradshaw provided Investigator Wright with a list of individuals 
from whom he had taken money. Investigator Wright compared and confirmed the list with 
information obtained in the course of the investigation and it proved to be accurate. 
DATED this a — day of May, 2001. 
Robert K. Heineman 
Attorney for defendant 
Charlene Barlow 




R 156: 2-10 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good m o r n i n g . 
(Off t h e r e c o r d . ) 
THE COURT: And Mr. Heineman with the defendant are 
present. 
The matter was set on this calendar for the purpose 
of scheduling and the decision that I would make in relation 
to the defendant's motion, which was a motion to quash the 
bind over and reduce the degree of the offenses charged and 
also to—and that was in relation to the counts of 
communication fraud and also to quash the count of 
racketeering. 
And then I suppose in relation to my—well, and then 
to schedule the matter because regardless of my determination 
here, there would still be a matter that would need a setting-
-well, I suppose if I quashed, that would send back the matter 
to be—for a preliminary hearing and so it's a matter of 
scheduling either a trial or sending it back for a further 
preliminary hearing and—and setting that preliminary hearing. 
So, that's the scheduling, I think, that's anticipated, one of 
those two. 
And I've considered at some length here, the—the 
motion that's made and I've heard argument on the matter and— 
and also in connection with the matter, there had been a 
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waiver of the preliminary hearing for the set of facts 
entitled Stipulated Testimony for Preliminary Hearing that had 
been submitted as a factual basis in terms of my consideration 
of the motions that I've just indicated. 
The first motion is to quash the bind over in 
connection with the counts of communication fraud. I won't—I 
won't rehash, if you will, the arguments and the various 
considerations. It seems to me that the argument basically 
hinged on how one would interpret the word "another" as to 
whether that was plural or singular and whether the term 
"scheme" as used in the statute, was restricted in some way 
to—to each victim. 
That seemed to be the thrust of the argument, so 
consequently aggregating various—the—the amounts obtained or 
sough to be obtained from various victims would not be the 
statutory scheme, if you will, a scheme within a scheme, the 
statutory approach to communications fraud. 
But it appears to me that the word "another" can and 
is—can and is defined in the plural and basically, I come to 
that conclusion because the statute is very specific in 
aggregation of damages; in other words, the statute seems to 
add to the definition that draws the conclusion for me that 
"another", the term "another" can be plural. 
The term "scheme" however, is singular but it's not 
singular in terms of victims; in other words, it's not one 
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victim, one scheme. I think the statutory approach here is 
that we aggregate within the scheme to determine the degree of 
the offense of each communication. The way the State has 
charged this is, rather than a—one communication, one count, 
they have one victim, one count, although the allegation is 
that one has communicated with this victim. 
So, the way they've chosen to do this, although I 
can see the possibility of taking each communication with one 
victim and breaking that out to one count, I don't see that 
this is a question of double jeopardy, because what the 
statute seeks to punish is different communications, is 
individual communications. So, that's the conduct and of 
course, this presumes—I've taken the facts as being able to 
be proved by the State. 
They do have to show, the State does have to show 
that there is a scheme here, but that's not necessarily under 
the statute restricted to one victim. I—that's my conclusion 
on that. 
I don't think this is a Shondell situation because 
as I say, this is—this is not a theft and a theft. The 
Shondell situation would be—or the Shondell rule, I should 
say, would be, if I have one set of conduct that's punishable 
under two statutes, then I'd pick the statute that has the 
least penalty, has the lesser penalty. 
But the conduct that's being punished here is not 
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the theft. It is the communication in a scheme to defraud. 
That's a different—that's not a theft, that's communication 
fraud and not a Shondell situation. 
In terms of the racketeering, that—that's—the 
argument there seemed to hinge on, seemed to focus—well, on 
whether an individual is the one one invests in and so forth. 
The statute permits that. What racketeering seems to be under 
the statute is that I engage in a certain defined category of 
conduct, which is a series of offenses. And then, that 
qualifies then for the racketeering, but then I must do 
something with the—the gains from that criminal activity. 
And the argument, the defense argument seems to me 
that there's, quite frankly, no showing, I suppose, what—as 
to what happened to this—the ill-gotten gains; but that's a 
matter of proof that we don't have as yet. 
So, the only issue that I'm called upon at this 
point, I suppose, to determine is to whether the State must 
show that your investment or your—where these—where these 
illegally obtained proceeds went was somewhere else other thar 
the individual defendant. And it appears to me that the 
statute does anticipate that if you use for yourself the—the-
-the gains, then you are in violation of the racketeering if 
the predicate is also proven, that is a series of criminal 
activity. 
What I don't have in the stipulated facts is where 
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these ill-gotten gains—how they were used. But that is not 
to say, because there was a waiver of the preliminary hearing, 
that the State is not to be given an opportunity to make that 
necessary showing. 
Now, I don't know what was anticipated under that 
kind of a circumstance. I guess what I'm indicating to you is 
this: You've waived the preliminary hearing, reserving these 
arguments and giving me a set of facts upon which to determine 
these arguments, but I find the stipulated testimony 
inadequate on this one issue, in terms of the use of the ill-
gotten gains. 
Now, I don't know what was anticipated. Whether a 
preliminary hearing to focus in on those non-existent facts or 
if there was non-existent facts, that because there was a 
waiver, waived the preliminary hearing. 
MR. HEINEMAN: I think what we were contemplating 
was— 
THE COURT: Am I—am I—have I confused—have I 
confused the situation? 
MR. HEINEMAN: Well, perhaps we confused it by 
calling it a waiver because perhaps more of what it was was a 
bind over upon stipulated facts rather than a—a waiver in the 
typical sense of a waiver. We're not doing anything at all 
here at this particular hearing. 
THE COURT: Well, I can—yeah, and as I say, I 
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understand the argument, but it seems to hinge on how—how— 
how were the gains used and indeed, there has to be a showing, 
although it may be that he used the gains himself, which I 
would determine to be sufficient under the statute, but 
there's nothing in the facts, I suppose other than the 
implication, I don't—as I went through the facts, I didn't— 
there was no fact presented to me regarding how the proceeds 
were to be used or were used. 
MR. HEINEMAN: And I guess my argument on that point 
was a little more specific. It's my contention that in order 
to meet the elements of that statute, they have to show it was 
invested somehow towards furthering the scheme; so him using 
the proceeds for himself, to buy himself some Star Bucks 
Coffee or take himself to the movie or put gas in his car for 
whatever purpose, wouldn't meet that. If he uses the proceeds 
to print out business cards to help further his communication 
fraud scheme, arguably, that would. 
And that's how I was seeing that particular 
distinction and I don't believe the State has any evidence 
that these were used for anything other than him and his just 
normal living expenses. 
THE COURT: Well, and that's what I'm—I'm finding, 
that I respectfully disagree; that using the proceeds for 
himself, if you will, or not towards furthering the scheme 
does qualify under that element in the racketeering. 
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What I didn't have in the facts and I apologize if I 
just misread them, but there was nothing that indicated one 
way or the other how it was used. There is an element that 
must show that the proceeds were used, consequently, I suppose 
if you had a circumstance where I got some money from somebody 
and didn't use it at all, I held it, that that may be— 
although I'm not going to decide that today, but that may well 
be a circumstance in which one of the essential elements of 
racketeering has not been met, but because the facts didn't 
take it that one more step as to how the—how it was used at 
all, then I didn't know whether—well, like I say, that's my 
determination. But whether you anticipated a need here, other 
than through trial but at preliminary hearing to get into that 
other element, that is how the proceeds were used, I—I didn't 
know that. That's why I leave that question open. 
MS. BARLOW: Your Honor, I did want to point out on 
Page 9, Mr. Bradshaw admitted to Investigator Wright that he 
used the money to pay his personal bills. That's the only 
thing that we put into the stipulated facts. It's— 
THE COURT: Well, maybe I didn't see that then. 
MS. BARLOW: Well, and it is just one sentence. I 
can see how the Court might— 
THE COURT: Right at the end. 
MS. BARLOW: Yeah. Right. 
THE COURT: Well, that may be suffi—I don't— 
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MS. BARLOW: I don't know that it matters, you know. 
THE COURT: Well, it doesn't. That's exactly the 
sort of thing, I suppose, that I was looking for in terms of 
how they were used, because the argument is, How are they 
used? And if that statement—and I didn't—I didn't pick up 
on that last sentence, I suppose. If that statement is a—a 
statement intended to go to the proceeds, then I suppose that 
answers my question and there's nothing further, but I—I 
mean, in terms of further testimony by way of a preliminary 
hearing to—to determine that issue. 
Mr. Heineman, your comment on that? 
MR. HEINEMAN: Well, that is in the stipulation and 
that's what all of us anticipated. And frankly, even if it 
weren't in there, there's probably a reasonable inference just 
from the fact that he received these monies. Most people will 
use money rather than stuff it in a mattress; but— 
THE COURT: Well, as I say, I don't—that's 
certainly an essential element that the State is going to have 
to prove and— 
MR. HEINEMAN: But the legal issue as— 
THE COURT: But to—but to the legal issue as to 
whether the proceeds must be used to further the scheme, as I 
say, I respectfully disagree. 
Consequently, your motion is denied and-—and as I 
say, I think that leaves us then with setting this matter for 
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trial. 
MR. HEINEMAN: We'll probably have a—a disposition 
with a conditional guilty plea is what I'm contemplating. 
THE COURT: Would you like to set this maybe for 
some scheduling date or— 
MR. HEINEMAN: Why don't we pick a disposition date 
and if— 
THE COURT: Disposition. 
MR. HEINEMAN: —further proceedings are needed 
after that, we can schedule them at that time. 
THE COURT: If that's agreeable, then let7s set it 
for—I would put it on a law and motion calendar. July 31st, 
August 14th. 
MR. HEINEMAN: I'm going to be out of town both 
those dates. If we could do the 28th? 
THE COURT: 28th of August at 9:00 o'clock. 
Ms. Barlow? 
MST BARLOW: That's fine, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's show then that date as a 
disposition date and Mr. Bradshaw, we'd have a written notice 
for you of that hearing. 
Is there anything further to consider on this 
matter? 
MS. BARLOW: No. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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